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Attorney at Law 
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Layton, Utah 84041 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAZIAH MAY HANCOCK and 
CINDY STEWART, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH ; 
OF JESUS CHRIST OF THE SAINTS ] 
OF THE LAST DAYS, ; 
JAMES D. HARMSTON, WILLIAM ; 
B. LITHGOW, KEITH LARSON, ; 
DANIEL (DAN) SIMMONS, KAY ) 
CRABTREE, JEFF HANKS, ) 
BART MULSTROM, JOHN HARPER, ) 
and JOHN DOE'S NOS. 1 TO 5, ) 
Defendants. ) 
) SECOND 
) AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 980600126 
COMES NOW Don S. Redd, Attorney for and in behalf of Plaintiffs, Kaziah May Hancock 
(hereinafter "Ms. Hancock") and Cmdy Stewart (hereinafter "Ms. Stewart") and Complains and 
alleges as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND PARTIES 
1. (a) That plaintiffs are individuals residing in Sanpete County, State of Utah. 
(b) Defendant "The True and Living Church of Jesus Christ of the Saints of the 
Last Days is an unincorporated entity headquartered in Sanpete County, State of Utah. 
(c) Defendant James D. Harmston ("Mr. Harmston") is an individual residing in 
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Sanpete County, State of Utah. 
(d) Defendant William B. Lithgow is an individual who was residing in Sanpete 
County, State of Utah at the time of these causes of action. 
(e) Defendant Keith Larson is an individual residing in Sanpete County, State of 
Utah. 
(f) Defendant Daniel Simmons is an individual residing in Sanpete County, 
State of Utah. 
(g) Defendant Kay Crabtree is an individual who was residing in Sanpete 
County, State of Utah at the time of these causes of action. 
(h) Defendant Jeff Hanks is an individual who was residing in Sanpete County, 
State of Utah at the time of these causes of action. 
2. James D. Harmston is the founder and ultimate leader of the True and Living 
Church of Jesus Christ of The Saints of the Last Days, (hereinafter "the TLC") 
3. Mr. Harmston is also the head of an organization referred to as "The Church of the 
Firstborn." 
4. On or about November of 1993 Ms. Hancock became affiliated with the True and 
Living Church of Jesus Christ of The Saints of the Last Days. 
5. On or about April 11, 1995 Ms. Stewart became affiliated with the True and Living 
Church of Jesus Christ of The Saints of the Last Days. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(BREACH OF CONTRACT -- all defendants) 
6. In support of her First Cause of Action, Plaintiffs re-allege each and every allegation 
contained in paragraphs #1 through #5 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
7. After becoming affiliated with the TLC the Plaintiffs were induced by Mr. 
Harmston and his religious subordinates to liquidate their assets and place them into the control of 
the Defendants. 
8. On or about March 25, 1996 the Plaintiff, Kaziah May Hancock, met with the 
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"Bishopric" of the TLC, Keith Larson, Kay Crabtree, and Kent Braddy, to establish a stewardship 
for her in exchange for her contribution of money and time to the TLC. 
9. In exchange for money, goods, and services to be given by the Plaintiff, Kaziah May 
Hancock, to the Defendants the Plaintiff was assured and promised by the TLC and/or its 
representatives that she would receive back a "slewardship" of .property and support in exchange for 
the funds she "consecrated" to the TLC. 
10. As a further inducement for the Plaintiff to "consecrate" her wealth over to the 
Defendants, Plaintiff was promised by Mr. Harmston that they would become members of The 
Church of the Firstborn and would meet Christ face to face. 
Cindy Stewart liquidated her entire retirement savings at the insistence of Mr. 
Harmston and turned all the funds over to him for the use of the TLC. 
Harmston and other acting as TLC officers promised Cindy Stewart full repayment 
of her money plus payment of all her costs and losses for early withdrawal of her retirement funds. 
11. Kaziah May Hancock did deliver money, goods and services to the Defendants after 
this time and continued to do so until Ms. Stewart was excommunicated in or about May 1997 and 
Ms. Hancock was asked to leave in or about August 1997. 
12. Plaintiff, Kaziah May Hancock, never received a "stewardship" of any kind as 
promised. 
13. Plaintiff, Kaziah May Hancock, never met Christ face to face as promised. 
14. Plaintiff, Cindy Stewart was never repaid her retirement or the costs and penalties 
she incurred for the early withdrawal. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(FRAUD/CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD/NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION - all defendants) 
15. In support of their Second Cause of Action, Plaintiffs re-allege each and every 
allegation contained in paragraphs #1 through #14 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
16. By appealing to the Plaintiffs deepest spiritual needs and commitments, Mr. 
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Harmston, along with other Defendants, persuaded the Plaintiffs that Mr. Harmston was the sole 
spokesman on earth for God and thus gained the confidence of the Plaintiffs. 
17. After gaining a superior position of confidence with the Plaintiffs, Mr. Harmston 
and other Defendants took unfair advantage of that position by persuading the Plaintiffs that they 
must turn over their wealth to the Defendants. 
18. Promises were made by many of the Defendants, including Mr. Harmston, acting in 
his own person and as an agent of the TLC to Ms. Hancock that if she sold her ranch in Indianola 
and consecrated her assets to the TLC, she would receive back a "stewardships" ,or~a~place where 
she could continue to raise her animals. 
19. Promises were made by Mr. Harmston, acting in his own person and as an agent of 
the TLC, to Ms. Stewart that if she liquidated her ERA account and consecrate the monies from the 
account to him he would repay her and pay any tax liability she would incur for early withdrawal. 
20. Mr. Harmston, acting in his own person and as an agent of the TLC, also promised 
Ms. Stewart that she shouldn't be concerned about giving up her ERA account because he and/or the 
TLC would always take care of her. 
21. Mr. Harmston, along with other officers of the TLC: 
(i) made representations to the Plaintiffs promising future performance; 
(ii) the statements of future performance was false; 
(iii) the false statements of future performance was material; 
(iv) the Defendants either knew that the statements of future performance 
made to the Plaintiffs were false or were ignorant of their truth; 
(v) the Defendants intended that the Plaintiffs would act upon the false 
statements and in the manner reasonably contemplated; 
(vi) the Plaintiffs were ignorant of the falsity of the statements of future 
performance made to them by the Defendants; 
(vii) the Plaintiffs relied on the false statements of future performance made to 
them by the Defendants; 
(viii) The Plaintiffs had a right to rely on the statements of future performance 
to be true; 
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(ix) The Plaintiffs turned over their property and means to Mr. Harmston and/or 
the TLC and consequently suffered the loss and conversion of nearly all their assets. 
22. Plaintiffs allege that the above actions were intentional on the part of Mr. Harmston 
acting in his own person and/or as an agent of the TLC, and some of the Defendants, and constitute 
actual fraud; or the above actions were unintentional on the part of the Defendants and constitute 
constructive fraud and/or negligent misrepresentation. 
23. Failure to perform on a future promise constitutes a false statement under the 
circumstances required by law and/or equity as follows: 
(i) the promisor(s) had a pecuniary interest in the transaction; [Galloway v. 
AFCO Development Corp. 777 P.2d 506 (Utah App 1989)]. 
(ii) the promisor(s) had control over whether or not the promise was fulfilled; 
["Statements ... relating to future events may be actionable ... where the 
future event is full within the declarant's control." 37 C.J.S. 14(b) (Fraud); 
also Logan Equipment Co. v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 736 F.Supp. 1188. 
"Generally, redress may be had ... for an unfulfilled promise to perform in 
the future made with the undisclosed intention not to perform, or without 
the intention to perform, and for the purpose of inducing action." 37 C.J.S. 
15 (Fraud)]. 
(iii) the promise has a fiduciary, confidential, or superior relationship with the 
promisee; 
["Where a relation of trust and confidence exists between two parties, so 
that one of them places peculiar reliance in the other's trustworthiness, the 
latter is liable for representations as to future conduct, and not merely as to 
past facts." 37 C.J.S. 14(b) (Fraud); also Southern Mortg. Co. v. O'Dom, 
699 F.Supp 1227; Stewart v. Phoenix Nat. Bank, 64 P .2d 101, 49 Ariz. 34; 
Edmunds v. Valley Circle Estates, 2 Dist., 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 16 C.A. 4 
1290]. 
Plaintiff alleges that some or all three of the above exceptions existed in their relationships and 
dealings with the Defendants. 
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(FRAUDULENT CONVERSION or in the alternative UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT/IMPLIED CONTRACT » all defendants) 
24. In support of their Third Cause of Action, Plaintiffs re-allege each and every 
allegation contained in paragraphs #1 through #23 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
25. Defendants have acquired about two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00) 
of money, services, or property from Ms. Hancock, and fifteen thousand seven hundred sixty-six 
dollars ($15,766.00) from Ms. Stewart by fraudulent conversion and/or unjust enrichment. The bulk 
of Ms. Stewart's money represented a retirement account awarded her in a divorce settlement and 
constituted nearly all of her assets. 
26. Defendants have breached an implied contract with Plaintiffs by refusing to provide 
valuable consideration, as promised, in the full amount of money, services, or property taken by the 
Defendants. 
27. By receiving or taking money, services, or property from Plaintiffs without 
providing equal value in return, Defendant's have been unjustly enriched to Plaintiffs detriment. 
28. As a result of Defendants unjust enrichment, Ms. Hancock have been damaged in 
the amount of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00); and Ms. Stewart has been 
damaged in the amount of fifteen thousand seven hundred sixty-six dollars ($15,766.00), plus pre-
judgment interest accruing since the time of the conversion of their money as permitted by Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 (hereinafter "U.C.A.")15-1-1(2). 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(RACKETEERING -- all defendants) 
29. In support of their Fourth Cause of Action, Plaintiffs re-alleges each and every 
allegation contained in paragraphs #1 through #28 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
30. Plaintiffs allege that the TLC qualifies as a racketeering enterprise under the Utah 
Criminal Code "Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act" U.C.A. 76-10-1601 et. seq. Defendants 
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affiliated with the TLC have committed at least three acts in violation of the "Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act." Defendants violations are stated in particularity as follows: 
(a) James D. Harmston and each other Defendant in conjunction with 
their leadership positions in the TLC and "The Church of the Firstborn", has 
violated the Utah Criminal Code "Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act" U.C.A. 76-10-
1601 et. seq. They have engaged in unlawful activity. Some of these unlawful activities are 
including, but not limited to: Theft by Deception, U.C.A. 76-6-405; Theft of Services, 
U.C.A. 76-6-409; Unlawful Dealing with Property by Fiduciary, U.C.A. 76-6-513; 
Communications Fraud, U.C.A. 76-10-1801, either directly or did aid and abet other 
Defendant's by some or all of the above actions. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
HARM - all defendants) 
31. In support of their Fifth Cause of Action, Plaintiffs re-allege each and every 
allegation contained in paragraphs #1 through #30 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
32. Plaintiffs have suffered great mental anguish and pain as a result of the loss from 
their life savings effected by the conversion their money by the Defendants. 
33. The actions of the Defendants named in this Complaint have significantly harmed 
and damaged the Plaintiffs. 
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defendants individually and 
severally and in their favor as follows: 
1. An award of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00) representing the 
actual value of money, goods, and services fraudulently converted from Ms. Hancock to the 
Defendant's use; and an award of fifteen thousand seven hundred sixty-six dollars ($15,766.00) 
representing the actual value of money received from Ms. Stewart by fraudulent conversion. 
2. An award of interest accruing at ten percent per annum on the amount of money 
converted from the Plaintiffs to the Defendant's use as allowed by Utah Code Annotated 15-1-1 
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since the date of the conversion. 
3. An award of damages as allowed as a civil penalty by Utah's "Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act," Utah Code Annotated 76-10-1605 et. seq. equal to double the total amount of 
Plaintiffs actual damages in the loss of their principle plus accrued interest, and costs of litigation 
including reasonable attorney fees. 
4. An award of punitive damages as allowed by, and in keeping with, Utah Code 
Annotated 78-18-1 et. seq. in the amount of treble the total amount of Plaintiffs actual damages in 
the loss of their principle plus accrued interest. 
5. An award of two hundred fifty thousand ($250,000.00) for the mental anguish 
suffered by Cindy Stewart and Ms. Hancock which represents the amount of the funds taken from 
her; and as award of fifteen thousand seven hundred sixty-six dollars ($15,766.00) for the mental 
anguish suffered by Ms. Stewart which represents the amount of the funds taken from her. 
6. An award of attorney's fees and costs. 
7. And such other relief as the court deems appropriate. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMnTED this _ / 2 day of February 2003. 
DON S. REDD, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 
44 North Main 
Layton, Utah 84041 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Amended Complaint was 
mailed on the [ A day of February 2003 by depositing same in the U.S. Mail to the following: 
John H. Jacobs 
Attorney for Crabtree 
75 N. Center St. 
American Fork, UT 84003 
F. Kevin Bond 
Budge W. Call 
Mark S. Middlemas 
Attorneys for Defendants 
311 S. State Suite 410 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Keith Larson 
111 West Center 
Snowflake, AZ 85937 
Clark R. Nielsen 
Attorney at Law 
68 S. Main St., Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
William Lithgow 
37550 Pine Knoll Ave 
Palm Desert, CA 92211 
Secretary 
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F. Kevin Bond (5039) 
Budge W. Call (5047) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
311 South State, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-8900 
Facsimile: (801) 521-9700 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAZIAHMAYHA..O : d 
CINDY STEWART, 
Plaintiffs, 
THE TRUE AND LIVING CHUK-
OF JESUS CHRIST OF SAINTS 
OF THE LAST DAYS, JAMES D. 
HARMSTON, WILLIAM B. 
LITHGOW, KEITH LARSON, 
DANIEL (DAN) SIMMONS, KAY 
CRABTREE, KENT BRADDY, 
JEFF HANKS, BART MUSTROM, 
JOHN HARPER and JOHN DOES 
NOS. 1 *. 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER 
12(b)(6) and 9(b) U.R.C.P. 
Civil No. 980600126 
Judge David L. Mower 
ij)Mi-. .\ '''• , .;.e Defendants, ;i.v. :;LL. .^:^ , , ,.... ^;;ui\_;; „: j ; . . ^ •..:.;..,; J : 
Saints of the Last Days (hereinafter "TLC"), James D. Harmston, Daniel Simmons, Kent Braddy, 
Bart Mulstrom, and John Harper and hereby submit this Memorandum in Support of their Motion 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT CANNOT ADJUDICATE CHURCH DOCTRINE. 
The alleged promises that Hancock would be a member of the Church of the First 
Born, would see Christ face to face, and at some point would receive a "stewardship"of property 
from the Lord; all deal with Church doctrine, not subject to adjudication by the Court. 
The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibit the free exercise thereof. These two clauses known as the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, limit government activity in religious doctrine. 
Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602, 29 L.Ed.2d 745, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (1971). 
It is well settled in the federal courts and in the State of Utah, that the Establishment 
Clause prohibits judicial review and interpretation of church law, policies, or practices; and the 
determination of these claims is barred by the First Amendment. Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter Day Saints, 21.P.3d 198 (Utah 2001). Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzmam 403 U.S. 602 (1971); and 
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral 344 U.S. 94, 97 (1952) wherein the U.S. Supreme Court states: 
"churches must have power to decide for themselves, free from state interference matters of church 
government as well as those of faith and doctrine." Id. at 116. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Lafferty states 
Men may believe what they cannot prove. Religious experiences which are as real as 
life to some maybe incomprehensible to others. Similarly due process considerations 
[under both the state and federal constitutions] bar courts from requiring defendants 
to prove the truth of their religious beliefs because they would have to prove the 
unprovable, an obvious unfairness of the most fundamental kind. State v. Lafferty, 
749 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1988). 
2 
Plaintiffs' Breach of Contract claim deals \\ ith chi irch doctrine such as consecration, 
obedience and faith. Things that Church members believe which cannot be proven. The Court cannot 
adjudicate these issues. Nut only would Midi litigation he in violation ol the 1 list Aiuendinenl, but 
it would have a drastic chilling effect, prohibiting all churches from accepting charitable contributions 
based upon their inability to prove their doctrine and beliefs in a court of law. 
T]--- '"iv I lefts v. Mu;;os. •- ":> ' l .' . . - -i; -vi.V • . > 
adjudication of church doctrine. Jeffs v. Stubbs involved a property dispute over certain land 
possessed by the claimants. I here was no question c f cl lurch doctrine :: entral to the case, but issues. 
of real property law, i.e. w hether the occupants had a life estate or were tenants at will. I lowever, 
facts alleged in this case "consecrating" money to see,Christ face to face, to be a member of the 
Church of the Firstborn, an :! t : receh ;re a ste\* ardship ft 0111 the I ord. , do i lecessarily im ;rolve issi les 
of church government, faith and doctrine. 
If Hancock v» *;;L^ . ; •. ::• .1 f u - • - ; ! pci * . •• i '..:*...* . -.A :,d\-.i 
negotiated a price, and had the necessary deeds prepared, signed and recorded. The Court then 
would have been able to enforce the written contract according to its terms without interfering or 
(•:-•.in/ling it .ch ir ^;r:-u / :'* . * - - . Jelts v. Stubbs " ••' : • < m-\ t • i-,--h. <'\^--: 
from doing this simply because a religious entity was involved. 
I lowever, in this case the claim is tl mt moi iej vv as donated or "consecrated" to the 
Church and that verbal promises were made regarding membership in the Church of the Firstborn, 
seeing Christ face to face, and receiving a "stewardship" of property from the Lord. There are no 
leizal * : ° ' • : k" ••! i^ui1^ I'm ifh ( , ! • •• , 
twined w i t h Church doc t r ine . 
3 
H. THE ALLEGED PROMISES ARE TOO ILLUSORY TO ENFORCE. 
The promises allegedly made, even if not religious in nature, are so illusory that they 
still cannot be enforced. To be a member of the Church of the Firstborn, to see Christ face to face, 
and to receive a "stewardship" of property from the Lord; are all too indefinite to be enforced. In 
fact, the Plaintiff, may still receive all of these blessings at some point, if she remains faithful. A 
supposed promise is illusory when it is so indefinite that it cannot be enforced with any certainty. 
Resource Management v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985). See ako Wharf Restaurant 
Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 605 P.2d 334 (Wash.App. 1979) (when its provisions are such as to make its 
performance entirely discretionary on the part of the alleged promisor, the promise is illusory and 
cannot be enforced); Goodpaster v. Pfizer, Inc. 665 P.2d 414 (Wash.App. 1983) (promise is illusory 
when it is so indefinite that it cannot be enforced); Lane v. Wahl 6 Pod 621 (Wash.App. 2000) (an 
"illusory promise" is one that is so indefinite that it cannot be enforced, or by its terms, makes 
performance optional or entirely discretionary on the part of the promisor). The alleged promises in 
this case, to be a member of the Church of the Firstborn, to see Christ face to face, and to receive 
a "stewardship" of property, are so indefinite and discretionary that they are illusory and 
unenforceable. Id. 
m . ANY PROMISE TO CONVEY REAL PROPERTY OR SUPPORT 
FOR LIFE IS INVALID UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The Plaintiffs have alleged an oral promise to receive a "stewardship''of property. 
There is no writing to bind the Defendants to a contract to convey, or provide any interest in, real 
property. Under Utah law, the Statute of Frauds requires that a contract for the sale of, or for any 
interest in, real property exceeding a year, must be in writing. §25-5-1 U.C. A. Stangl v. Ernst 
4 
Home Center; Inc. 943 P 2d 356 (I It \,pp 199 7) (agreemei it to ei ltei into real estate lease for 
period longer than one year is within Statute of Frauds and must be in writing to be enforceable); 
Martin v. Allbritton, ao_ ; _.. J ' . . - . • . , . VIAVJL* lid; .i.i.u .i> u ^ c ,< AD* 
providing for such an interest in property, therefore this claim must fail as a matter of law. 
The Statute of Frauds further provides that any agreement that by its terms is not 
to bv perfpr'*:"<• ^ 'f: •*•• ; •• '• :* : >•' i ln ' . ' i j ' r tTn^" u:i; -ile^ ruc nr reement 
is in writing, signed by the party to be charged. §25-56-4 LLC. A. Therefore, any alleged verbal 
promise made to Hancock that in return lor I in doiKilious the ( 'In in I i would laic care ul" Iiei for 
the rest of her life, or provide support to her for the rest of her life, is also void and unenforceable 
under the Statute of Frauds. Id. 
p
-^
f!
 "c^*- n: lai ice ha s not been a lleged in this •• ^  - p- • :n it b< v~r--~:e there was 
no delivery of real property. Binninger v. Hutchison, 355 So.2d M J (Fla.App. 1978) (before 
partial performance exception to tl le statute of ft audsi nay be applied. deli v ei ;; of possessioi in lust 
be made pursuant to the terms of the contract); Robertson v. Melton, 115 SW.2d 624 (possession 
by the purchaser of realty is an indispensable element of part performance); Leverettv. Leverett, 
of consideration and the making of valuable improvements). Hancock did not take possession of, 
or make any improvements, u; .... :^.. . . ,._• y. 
Furthermore, part performance of an oral contract not to be performed within a 
year, does not take it out of the Statute of Frauds. Trethewey v. Bancroft-Whitney Co. 534 P.2d 
1382 (Wash Aji|i lr | -,ku I fin dm hiii** of piiil prrfnrmnmr dors iiui .ipph, M \hv rlnuse of the 
statute of frauds declaring void every oral contract not to be performed within one year, such 
5 
application would in effect repeal this clause of the statute); Manning v. Woods. Inc., 357 P.2d 
757 (Kan. 1960) (a parol contract not to be performed within a year, is not enforceable or taken 
out of the statute by part performance). Therefore, any oral agreement or promise to provide 
support for the rest of Hancock's life, is void and unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. 
Finally, the Plaintiffs cannot seek liability against the other Defendants, who were not 
a party to the alleged promises. The Statute of Frauds requires a writing before any party is required 
to answer for the debt of another. Automotive Mfgrs. Warehouse, Inc. v. Service Auto Parts. Inc., 
596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979) § 25-5-4(2) U.C.A. Without the necessary writing signed by each 
Defendant, such a claim is unenforceable as a matter of law. Commodore Home Systems Inc. v. 
Citicorp., 780 P.2d 674 (Okl. 1989) 
IV. ALLEGATIONS OF ERAUD HAVE NOT BEEN MADE 
WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY UNDER RULE 9(b). 
Rule 9(b) U.R.C.P. requires that allegations of fraud be plead with sufficient 
particularity. The Plaintiffs have made reference to one Bishopric Meeting where promises were 
allegedly made with only three Defendants present. However, the Plaintiffs have included all of 
the Defendants in their Fraud claim, claiming that they also persuaded them. This is insufficient 
to establish a meritorious claim. 
Under Rule 9(b) U.R.C.P. the Plaintiffs must set forth the circumstances 
constituting the fraud as to each individual Defendant, i.e, what representations were made by 
whom, and at what time. This is particularly important in this case, since the Utah Liability 
Reform Act, abolishing joint and several liability, requires an apportionment of fault as to each 
6 
Defendant, or other potentially liable parties. Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Parker; 936 P.2d 
1088 (Ut.App. 1997). 
Fi irti lern lore. tl risCoi n tl: lasali ead) foi n id tl lattl le ii if : i matioi lpi CT\ idedii I this case 
was insufficient as to each of the individual Defendants to enter a judgment. Use of the terms 
"fraud"and "conspiracy" and "negligence" in the complaint, constitutes general accusations in 
,]]C f ,;rm 0f conclusions, without setting forth the basic facts sufficient to constitute the fraud, and 
will not stand up to a motion to dismiss. Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990 (Utah 1962). 
\ THERE IS NO CLAIM IN UTAH FOR CLERICAL 
MALPRACTICE FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DIJTY 
Rule 9(b) would also apply to Plaintiffs' Constructive Fraud claim. Furthermore, 
there Ldii.* ^
 : . >,..\ ^ .- -..IK .*-\a:d ictujiu^ a lnJm. uuy 
relationship. Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985). The Utah Courts have refused 
to establish a fiduciary relationship between religious leaders and their members, L o determine 
tU'tn'.e*-;-,
 ; ]: :iv- .. -. - v 1 ••! v i ' ^ n l d e n t , ::-".-. '"• h1- ' \cr* H>~hr-p. -— f-:r . -;>W<, 
minister or other cleric in the state, would require the courts to evaluate and investigate religious 
of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Franco v. L.D.S. Church, 21 P,3d 198 at 
206 (Utah 2001). See also White v. Blackburn, 7h, J\^u
 4_. A... ,_ ^ - - V r >s^>* -^orcilie 
i -* diTliiuvi to establish a cause of action for clerical malpractice. 
\ I. THE CLAIM OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
IS NOT RECOGNIZED FOR FUTURE PROMISES. 
T!"- " "' •''" vgligeni inisrqire^!i»aiirTi appii >• : u r r i li;^ he- •• - r<> ^irrr.t 
misrepresentation of an existing fact. High Country Movin\ Inc. v. U.S. West Direct Co., 839 
7 
P.2d 469 (Colo. App. 1992) (a claim of negligent misrepresentation cannot be based solely on a 
claim of nonperformance of a promise to do something in the future). The Plaintiffs have not 
alleged the misrepresentation of any existing material fact, but have claimed that statements made 
concerning some future performance were false. Since the Plaintiffs have failed to allege the 
negligent misrepresentation of an existing material fact, this claim should be dismissed. Id-
VH. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM 
FOR FRAUDULENT CONVERSION. 
Conversion is a distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another's personal 
property, without lawful justification. The elements for conversion are: (1) plaintiffs ownership 
or right to possession of the property at the time of the conversion; and (2) defendant's conversion 
by a wrongful act or disposition of plaintiff s property rights; and (3) damages. Therefore, there 
can be no cause for the conversion money. 
Plaintiffs in this case have alleged that money was consecrated to the Church in 
return for certain promises, i.e., being a member of the Church of the Firstborn, seeing Christ 
face to face and receiving a stewardship of property to raise goats. The Plaintiffs have not alleged 
that the Defendants obtained any personal property of the Plaintiffs by any wrongful act, but that 
the property was freely given. 
Moreover, conversion applies to the wrongful possession of tangible personal 
property, not for the return of money, or damages on a cause of action. The Plaintiffs have not 
been deprived of ownership of personal property. Allied Inv. Corp. v. Jasen, 731 A.2d 957 
(Md. 1999). (conversion applies to rights in specific tangible property not for the return of 
8 
money). It is not alleged that the Defendants exerted any wrongful dominion over the Plaintiffs 
tangible property by a wrongful act, therefore, this claim should be dismissed. 
l Jt-JuAINTIFFS HAVE ALLEGED A VERBAL CONTRACT; Til I ] S 
THERE CAN BE NO CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
Plaintiffs have alleged the existence of a verbal contract and have elected to sue for 
breach oi "tl lat coi ltract ' rherefore, Pla intiffs' cla in 1 foi i n i ji ist ei n icl in lent si 101 lid be disn lissed. 
Recovery under unjust enrichment is available only when no contract exists. Wood v. Utah Farm 
Bureau Ins. Co., . . \ - App. 2001) 
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs have admitted that the property was freely given or 
consecrated to the Church in exchange for certain promises. The fact the Plaintiffs voluntarily 
gave this n ic-iiey, \\\\\\ \\\\\ liidr. llini J.iim I i im|iist em ' x* . ...viich v. Deasoness Medical 
Center, 776 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1989) (to establish unjust enrichment, plaintiff cannot be a 
volunteer). 
IX. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ALLEGE A CLAIM FOR 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
In order to state a claim for Intentional Infliction oi Lmotional Distress the party 
rr.-^ ' .lll'.w-' * ' J r.1 ' M ••* (•; i s a * : » ; r ^ o m h h :"< d'. d 
against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality; (2) the offending party intended 
to cause, oi: acted ii I r eckless disregai d of tl: :«::: probability of causii ig? emotioi lal distress; (3) the 
plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (4) defendants' actions was an actual and 
proximate cause of the emotional distress. White v. Blackburn, <* i .~u i. ^ , i. . , u i.App. 
1990); Retherford v. A1' dv 1" Communications of the Mountain Sia.-.-s, .L, ^ — P '"d 04^ (•"' i-
971 (Utah 1992.) 
Plaintiffs have failed to properly allege these four necessary elements. Plaintiffs 
simply allege that they have suffered great mental anguish from losing money as a result of the 
Defendants' alleged failure to keep their promises. The loss of money, or breach of contract 
alone, is not sufficient to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. 
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs have failed to allege what conduct by each individual 
Defendant, was so outrageous and intolerable; and how the conduct of each Defendant was the 
direct cause of any severe emotional distress. Without specific facts, it is impossible to determine 
whether or not any of the Defendants acted outrageously or intolerable or was the cause of 
Plaintiffs' harm. 
X. SINCE THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ALLEGE ANY 
UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS 
THE RICO CLAIM SHOULD ALSO BE DISMISSED. 
The Plaintiffs' RICO claim should also be dismissed. As set forth above, the 
Plaintiffs have failed to allege any unlawful activity on the part of the Defendants, or any unlawful 
activity that would fall under the RICO statute. 
Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts to constitute Theft by Deception or Theft of 
Service under Utah's statutes. Plaintiffs have also failed to allege any facts constituting 
Communications Fraud or the Unlawful Dealing with Property by a Fiduciary. Plaintiffs have 
merely cited the statutory reference for these claims. They have not alleged any facts to support 
these claims. 
Merely citing statutes in conclusory form, without facts to substantiate the substance 
of the allegation, is not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Utah Steel & Iron Co. v. 
Bosch, 475 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1970) (motion to dismiss should have been granted where complaint 
10 
alleged defendants conspired to harass, annoy, threaten and intimidate plaintiff, but gave no notice 
of nature or substance of alleged acts, and did not mention causation between acts and alleged 
effects); W illiams v. Maie 1-arn 1 ^._ ^ . . ' *' ,- V ; •> .' v.: -N^ t • Ii*- alk^a: * 'e 
conclusion is not sufficient; the pleading must set forth the nature or substance of the acts 
COmpiaina 
The Plaintiffs cannot simply allege that the Defendant violated a statute and cite the 
statute they must set forth the nature and substance of the facts constituting the violation Id. The 
R ICO claii i 1 fa ils to do tl lis. a i id si 101 ilci be ciisi i lissed 
CONCLUSION 
Pl.iirui:"' jati act claii n cai n lot be adjudicated as it ii :n ol\ es Church 
doctrine; is illusory, and ii; violation of the Statute of Frauds, § 25-5-1 et. seg. U.C.A., 
Therefore it fails as a matter of law. Plaintiffs' Fraud claim fails to set forth the facts and 
named Defendant, as required under Rule 9(b) U.R.C.P. This claim should be dismissed. 
Negligent .\ii l e p e r s - , ' A o u . / a .;-• . n. .:ui-. L. ) 
be performed in the future, as alleged in this case. This claim should be dismissed. The State of 
Utah also does not recognize a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, i.e. Constructive Fraud, against 
clerical ministers, as si id i a findli ig w 01 ild 1 eqi lire the ecu irts to establisl 1. 01 favor. one religion 
over another, in violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause. This claim cannot stand. 
spiritual reasons, i.e. being a member of the Church of the Firstborn and seeing Christ face to 
face. There is no allegation of any specific personal property that was converted; and based on 
the Plaintiffs' own allegations, the Defendants did not obtain their donations through any unlawful 
means, as required for conversion. The Plaintiffs seeking a return of their money does not state 
a claim for conversion. 
Plaintiffs' claim for Unjust Enrichment also fails based on the pleadings, as 
Plaintiffs have alleged that they freely "consecrated" their money based on an alleged verbal 
contract. Plaintiffs have elected to sue under this alleged contract. Plaintiffs cannot allege the 
existence of a contract and that they voluntarily gave money to the Church and maintain their 
claim for Unjust Enrichment. 
Plaintiffs' RICO claim fails, as a matter of law, for the reasons stated above. 
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege any type of wrongful act on the part 
of the Defendants, or unlawful activity, that would fall under the "Pattern of Unlawful Activity 
Act" (RICO) statutes. 
Plaintiffs' claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress also fails. Plaintiffs 
have failed to allege the proper elements for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs 
claim that losing their money caused them great mental anguish, alone is insufficient to state a 
claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. 
Based on the foregoing all of Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed. 
DATED this /ZL day of March 2003. 
^^fr****** C^'£^*^X_ , 
B&f&fo. Call 
12 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify on the day of March, 2003, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Don S. Redd 
Attorney for Kaziah May Hancock 
and Cindy Stewart 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
44 North Main 
Lay ton. UT 84041 
Clark R. Nielson 
68 South Main Street, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Daniel Simmons 
True and Living Church of Jesus Christ 
of Saints of the Last Days 
37 South Main 
Manti, Utah 84642 
John H. Jacobs 
JACOBS & EDDY, P.C 
Attorney for Kay Crabtree 
75 North Center Street 
American Fork, UT 84003 
William Lithgow 
37550 Pine Knoll Ave. 
Palm Desert, CA 92211 
Keith Larson 
111 Center 
Snowflake AR 85937 
Phillip P. Savage 
340 West 400 South 
Manti, Utah 84642 
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IN THE S l V B ^ JUDICIAL DISTRgCffiff^^ 
0 F
 ^ U A ^ A I ) COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J . foo&^&S ^ordt diM 
Plaint i f f , 
v s . 
Kd^iaA AOM) rtrrrda^t 
T 
Defendant, 
STATE OF UTAH, Dept of 
Human Services 
Intervenor. 
* 
* 
it 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
AND JUDGMENT 
Case No, q^kOOOOZ 
Judge Lou/3 A Wim 
[ ] The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on 
before the Honorable . The 
Plaintiff appeared in person. 
[ ] The above-entitled matter came on before ine court on 
Plaintiff's Affidavit for Entry of Divorce Decree in 
accordance with Rule 4-913 Code of Judicial Administrations 
[ ]The Defendant was regularly served but failed to appear in 
person or otherwise file responsive pleadings and the Court 
therefore enters the Defendant's default. 
[ ]The Court issued an Order for Publication of Summons and said 
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Summons was published in the , 
a newspaper of general circulation in the above-entitled 
county once a week for four (4) consecutive weeks from 
to inclusive. The Clerk of Court 
mailed a true and correct: copy of the Summons and Complaint to 
the Defendant at his last known address and duly executed an 
Affidavit of Mailing certifying said mailing. 
[ ]The Defendant appeared in person and was represented by 
[ ]More than ninety days has passed since this matter was filed 
with the Court or the parties have completed the Divorce 
Education Course. 
The Court, having found and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and being otherwise fully advised, it is 
hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the Plaintiff is hereby awarded a Decree of 
Divorce from the Defendant, such to become final upon signature 
and entry herein. 
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2. That there have been 0 children born as issue of this 
marriage to wit: 
If = = -" — • — ,1 
CHILDREN BORN OF THIS MARRIAGE 
NAME DATE OF BIRTH SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 
[ ] 3. That the [ JPlaintiff [ jDefendant is a fit and proper 
person to be awarded the permanent care, custody and control of the 
minor children of the parties, subject to the [ JPlaintiff1 s [ 
jDefendant's right to visit with the children at reasonable times 
and places. 
[ ] 3. That both parents be awarded the joint legal custody of 
the minor children, but that the [ JPlaintiff [ JDefendant be 
awarded the primary physical custody of the children, subject to the 
other party's right to visit with the children at reasonable times 
and places-
[J 3. That each parent be awarded the permanent care, custody, 
and control of the minor children as specified below, subject to the 
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non-custodial parent's right to visit with the children at 
reasonable times and places. 
[ ] 3. That both parties be awarded the joint legal custody of 
the minor children, but that the primary physical custody of the 
children be given to each parent as specified below, subject to the 
non-custodial parent's right to visit with the children at 
reasonable times and places. 
1 CHILDREN BORN OF THIS MARRIAGE 
NAME CUSTODIAN 
4. That pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7 et sea. (1953 as amendpH;^ 
the [ ] Plaintiff [ ] Defendant be ordered to pay to the [ 
]Plaintiff [ JDefendant as and for child support: 
a. A sum of not less than $ per month as base 
support for the minor children of the parties, pursuant to the 
Uniform Child Support Guidelines until said children become 18 years 
of age, or have graduated from high school during the children's 
normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later. 
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Ljses naT affile^ 
b. The base child support award should be reduced by 50% 
for each minor child for time periods during which such minor child 
is with the non-custodial parent by order for at least 25 of any 30 
consecutive days. If the dependent child is a recipient of Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children, any agreement by the p-rtlca I^ r 
reduction of child support during extended visitation shall be 
approved by the Office of Recovery Services. However, normal 
visitation and holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be 
considered an interruption of the consecutive day requirement. 
c. The obligee (custodial parent) shall be entitled to 
mandatory income withholding relief pursuant to U.C.A. 62A-11 parts 
4 and 5 (1953 as amended), and any Federal and State tax refunds or 
rebates due the Defendant may be intercepted by the State of Utah 
and applied to existing child support arrearages. This income 
withholding procedure should apply to existing and future payors. 
All withheld income should be submitted to the Office of Recovery 
Services until such time as the Defendant no longer owes child 
support to the Plaintiff. 
d. The issue of child support arrearages may be determined 
by further judicial or administrative process. 
e. Each of the parties should be under mutual obligation to 
notify the other within ten (10) days of any change in monthly 
income -
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5. That pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7.15 (1953) as amended: 
a. Both parties should be required to maintain insurance 
for medical expenses for the benefit of the minor children where 
available at reasonable cost. 
b. Both parties shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs 
of the premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion 
of the insurance. 
c. Both parties should share equally all reasonable and 
necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and 
co-payments, incurred for the minor children and actually paid by 
the parties. 
d. The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide 
written verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to 
the other parent within 30 days of payment. 
e. A parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the 
right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other 
parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with 
the Subparagraph "d" above. 
6. That pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7.16 (1953 as amended) both 
parties should share equally the reasonable work-related or career 
or occupational training for child care expenses of the custodial 
parent. 
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a. The non-custodial parent shall begin paying his or her 
share of child care expenses on a monthly basis immediately upon 
presentation of proof of the child care expense. 
b. The parent who incurs child care expenses shall provide 
written verification of the cost and identity of a child care 
provider to the other parent upon initial engagement of a provider 
and thereafter on the request of the other parent. The parent shall 
notify the other parent of any change of a child care provider or 
the monthly expense of child care within 30* calendar days of the 
date of the change. A parent incurring child care expenses may be 
denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover 
the other parent's share of the expenses if the parent incurring the 
expenses fails to comply with these provisions. 
[ ] 7, That each party be ordered to assume and pay the 
following: 
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The Plaintiff: 
Obligation 
$v\lpyttv\ LLLwJoel^-
ttfvwe. o ^ e . 
I l^j^unt s wnl^^ 
pt. Ndy 
I Ph B^C 
The Defendant: 
Obligation 
||Azi*L <TK. ini&A- 4}art-*?!) 
fatuf^fw- v rdjmir 
Amount r 
5
 \%A 
s
 ZS7.a\ 
$
 «^LSZ>-CT)f 
5 7$Z.A 
s
 L61.*ot\ 
5
 #f. 7 J $ 1 
$ 
Amount 
$ /SD-&}\ 
%{<3dO.OZ) 1 
s 
II 
$ 
$ 
s 
s 
$ 
pLO 
c. All remaining debts and obligations should be the 
responsibility of the paxty who incurred the particular debt. 
[ ] 8. That personal property of the parties should be 
distributed as follows: 
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a . To t h e P l a i n t i f f : fnw JViW&r , 7 LtfVS<£J& 
To the Defendant 
(tilOMIWJZJS e^t&pf' 
' c . All remaining personal property should be awarded to 
-each of the parties as they have heretofore divided i t . 
[V] 9. That during the course of the marriage, the parties 
acquired certain real property to wit: 
r 1 a . A none - . ^ o CU. C U . 
XflM <{tl So- . AuJl- //A. 
more particularly described by the following legal 
description: 
Lot J. Sleds Z7. P/tfA" MM/Tf f.itY ^m/*rVt 5*^feJ&, 
JV) b . Such p r o p e r t y should oe sold, a s soon as reasonably-
p r a c t i c a b l e and the proceeds of t h e s a l e a p p l i e d as f o l l o w s : 
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i. FIrst# to pay expenses of sale; 
ii. Second, to retire any and all 
mortgages and liens; 
iii. Third, to pay all marital debts 
and obligations; 
iv. Last, the balance remaining 
thereafter to be divided equally 
between the parties. 
[ ] b. That the [ JPlaintiff ^Defendant be awarded the home 
and real property as [ ]Plaintiff's [W]Defendant's sole and 
exclusive property. 
[ ] b. That the [ JPlaintiff [V]Defendant should be awarded the 
exclusive use and possession of the parties' home until the 
occurrence of the first of the following conditions: 
i. The youngest child of the parties reaches 
eighteen (18) years of age, marries, or 
otherwise becomes emancipated; or/ 
ii . The party remarries; 
iii. The party ceases to use the home as the 
primary residence; 
iv. The partly cohabits with a non-relative 
adult of the opposite sex in the home. 
[ ] c. Upon the occurrence of the first of the conditions 
enumerated above, the Defendant should receive an appropriate share 
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of the equity existing at the date of the entry of the Decree of 
^""crz^ __ W.^;D uiauucr in said norae as determined by an appraisal 
conducted by a mutually agreed upon appraiser, and deducting from 
the appraised value the amount of all encumbrances. The Plaintiff 
should receive all equity in excess of the Defendant's 
aforementioned share of equity in said home existing at the time of 
the entry of the Decree in this matter. 
[ ] d. A home located at: 
3.1% U): 4& <£p. , /fab. (Jjf.§ 
more pa r t i cu la r ly described by the following legal 
d e s c r i p t i o n : 
4 r ^ bi**^£7. T/^T UA " /4AA/r/ d/rv SURVEY} Sa^^P: 
( ] a. Such property should be jold as soon cs reasonably 
practicable and the proceeds of the sale applied as follows: 
i. First, to pay expenses of sale; 
ii. Second, to retire any and all 
mortgages and liens; 
n i . Third, to pay ai* marital debts 
and obligations; 
iv. Last, the balance remaining 
thereafter to be divided equally 
between the parties. 
[ ] e. That the [ ] Plaintiff [ ]Defendant be awarded the home 
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and r e a l property as [ ] P l a i n t i f f ' s [ ]Defendant's so l e and 
exclusive property. 
[ ] e . That the [ ]P l a in t i f f £k] Defendant should be awarded the 
exclusive use and possession of the par t i es ' home u n t i l the 
occurrence of the f i r s t of the fallowing condit ions: 
i . The youngest chi ld of the p a r t i e s reaches 
eighteen (18) years of age, marr ies , or 
otherwise becomes emancipated; or/ 
i i . The par ty remarries; 
i i i . The par ty ceases to use the home as the 
primary residence; 
iv. The par ty cohabits with a non- re l a t i ve 
adult of the opposite sex in the home. 
[ 1 f. Upor .' «- ^ - u l . . •- . : . ' . iu J) i i t e coiiL.o \. • v i c 
e n u m e r a t e d above, t he D e f e n d a n t should r e c e i v e an a p p r o p r i a t e s h a r e 
of t h e e q u i t y e x i s t i n g a t t h e d a t e of t h e e n t r y of t h e D e c r e e of 
D i v o r c e i n t h i s m a t t e r i n s a i d home as d e t e r m i n e d by a n a p p r a i s a l 
c o n d u c t e d by a m u t u a l l y a g r e e d upon a p p r a i s e r , and d e d u c t i n g from 
t h e a p p r a i s e d v a l u e t h e amount of a l l encumbrances . The P l a i n t i f f 
s h o u l d r e c e i v e a l l e q u i t y i n excess of t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s 
a f o r e m e n t i o n e d s h a r e of e q u i t y i n s a i d home e x i s t i n g a t t h e t ime of 
t h e e n t r y of the Decree i n t h i s m a t t e r . 
P r o v i s i o n s R e l a t i n g to Al imony 
\Y\ 10 . That n e i t h e r p a r t y s hou ld be awarded a l i m o n y . 
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[ ] 10. That the Plaintiff be awarded a sum of not less than 
$ *—cf3 ~~ per month as alimony from Defendant. 
[ ] 10. That the Defendant be awarded a sum of not less than 
%bSO*crO per month as alimony from Plaintiff, 
[ ] 11. That the Defendant has pension and/or profit sharing plans 
or other retirement benefits through Defendant's place of 
employment. It is reasonable and proper that the Plaintiff receive 
one-half (£) of all benefits accrued pursuant to such plans during 
the marriage. 
[ ] 12. That the Plaintiff should be entitled to claim the 
parties' minor children as a tax deduction. 
[ ] 12. That the Defendant ^^uJd ':e ^w'zlM'i -c ic.:« 
parties' minor child as a tax deduction. 
[ ] 13. That the Defendant should be permanently restrained from 
bothering, harassing, annoying, threatening, or harming the 
Plaintiff at Plaintiffs place of residence, employment or any other 
place. 
[ ] 14. That each party should be ordered to assume his/her own 
costs and attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this action. 
[ ] 14. That the Defendant be required to pay the Plaintiffs 
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attorney's fees. 
[ ] 15. That the [ JPlaintiff [^Defendant be restored the use of 
her former name, fi&4\ (LOCK. • 
DATED this 
On this day of , 19 , a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce and Judgment was mailed, 
postage prepaid to 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
On this day of 19 I mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce and Judgment of 
Law, postage prepaid, 10 ^ 
and placed a true and correct copy of the same in the Attorney 
General's box in the Clerk's Office of the Judicial 
District Court, 
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Name: 
Address: 
Phone : 
C[. Qctsrtld^ \I^TCUM 
Y ' L : V 
Z3B JRN 6 PH 4 23 
IN THE &d^ 
.r\ _ . 
JUDICIAL DIST; 
OF S d ^ x f e f e COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
"X. O^q^/^ J^rckL^ 
Plaint i f f , 
vs • 
/^sixxl/i MaiA rB<h*< 
Defendant, 
STATE OF UTAH, Dept of 
Human Services 
Intervenor. 
* 
* 
• 
it 
• 
it 
it 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Case No, 
Judge 
[ ] The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on 
before the Honorable . The 
Plaintiff appeared in person. 
[ ] The above-entitled matter came on before the court on 
Plaintiff's Affidavit for Entry of Divorce Decree in 
accordance with Rule 4-913 Code of Judicial Administrations. 
[ ] The Defendant was regularly served but failed to appear in 
person or otherwise file responsive pleadings and the Court 
therefore enters the Defendant's default 
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[ ] The Court issued an Order for Publication of Summons and said 
Summons was published in the 
a newspaper of general circulation in the above-entitled 
county once a week for four (4) consecutive weeks from 
to inclusive. The Clerk of Court 
mailed a true and correct copy of the Summons and Complaint 
to the Defendant at his last known address and duly executed 
an Affidavit of Mailing certifying said mailing. 
[ ] The Defendant appeared in person and was represented by 
[ ] More than ninety days has passed since this matter was filed 
with the Court or the parties have completed the Divorce 
Education Course. 
The Court, having heard sworn testimony of the Plaintiff, having 
reviewed the file in this matter and being otherwise fully advised, 
enters its 
FINDINGS CF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff and/or the Defendant are bona fide residents 
of S o ^ VgLK> County of the state of Utah and have been for three 
months immediately prior to the filing of this action. 
2. The parties resided in the marital relationship in the 
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State of Utah or the acts complained of by the Plaintiff were 
committed by the Defendant in the State of Utah and therefore this 
Court has long-arm jurisdiction over the Defendant pursuant to 
U.C.A. 78-27-24(6) (1953 as amended). 
3. The Plaintiff and the Defendant were married on J? / £3f 77, 
in J^A^a^uria, I $JUA , and are presently married. The parties 
separated on or about 
4. During the course of the marriage the parties have 
experienced difficulties that cannot be reconciled that have 
prevented the parties from pursuing a viable marriage relationship. 
5. There have been 0 children born as issue of this marriage 
to wit: U^£-~~ 
CHILDREN BORN OF THIS MARRIAGE 
NAME DATE OF BIRTH SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 
6. Pursuant to Rule 4-S01(b), Utah Cooe of Judicial 
Administration, the Plaintiff states, upon information and belief, 
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that there are no proceedings for custody of the above-named minor 
children filed or pending in the Juvenile Court. 
7. Utah is the home State of said minor children pursuant to 
U.C.A. 78-45c-3(l)(a) (1953) as amended in that: 
a. Utah is the home state of the minor children 
at the time of commencement of this proceeding 
or it is in the best interest of the minor 
children that a court of this state assume 
jurisdiction because the minor children in 
addition to his parents or one of the 
contestants have a significant connection with 
this state and there is available in this state 
substantial evidence concerning the minor 
children's present or future care, protection, 
training, and personal relationships. 
[ ] b. Said minor children have resided at the 
following places and with the following 
parties outside of Utah: 
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P*e-2> 
Child's Name: 
NAME & RELATION DATE ADDRESS 
Child's Name: 
NAME & RELATION DATE ADDRESS 
Child's Name: 
NAME Sc RELATION DATE ADDRESS 
c. The Plaintiff has not been a party, witness or 
participated in any other capacity in any other 
litigation concerning the custody of the 
subject minor children in this State or any 
other State. 
[ ] d. The Plaintiff has no information of any custody 
proceeding concerning the subject minor 
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Vb&s ru^afyoCu 
children pending in a court of this or any 
other State. 
[ ] d. The Plaintiff has information regarding 
a custody proceeding concerning the subject 
minor children pending in a court of this 
or another state as described below: 
[ ] e. The Plaintiff does not know of any person, not 
a party to these proceedings who has physical 
custody of the subject minor children and who 
claims to have custody or visitation rights 
with respect to said children. 
[ ] e. The Plaintiff knows of a person, not a party to 
these proceedings who has physical custody of 
the subject minor children and who claims to 
have custody or visitation rights with respect 
to said children as described below: 
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Child Custody and Visitation 
[ ] 8. The [ ]Plaintiff [ JDefendant- is a fit and proper person 
to be awarded the permanent care, custody and control of the minor 
children of the parties, subject to the [ JPlaintiffs [ 
JDefendant1s right to visit with the children at reasonable times 
and places, 
[ ] 8. It is fair and reasonable that both parents be awarded 
the joint legal custody of the minor children, but that the [ 
]Plaintiff [ ]Defendant be awarded the primary physical custody of 
the children, subject to the other party's right to visit with the 
children at reasonable times and places-
[ ] 8. It is fair and reasonable that each parent be awarded the 
permanent care, custody, and control of the minor children as 
specified below, subject to the non-custodial parent's right to 
visit with the children at reasonable times and places. 
[ ] 8. It is fair and reasonable that both parties be awarded 
the joint legal custody of the minor children, but that the primary 
physical custody of the children be given to each parent as 
specified below, subject to the non-custodial parent's right to 
visit with the children at reasonable times and places. 
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1 CHILDREN BORN OF THIS MARRIAGE 1 
NAME CUSTODIAN 
[ ] 9. The Plaintiff is voluntarily underemployed or unemployed 
but is capable of working at a job which would pay $ per hour 
based upon Plaintiff's work experience during the period of the 
parties' marriage and income should be attributed to the Plaintiff 
in the amount of S per month. 
[ ] 9. The Plaintiff is employed at , 
earns $ per hour, works $ hours per week and therefore 
grosses $ per month. 
[ ] 9. The Plaintiff is not employed and receives per 
month unemployment, social security (or other countable public 
benefits as defined in 75-45-7.5 (1)) and receives $ per 
month AFDC (or other non-countable public benefits as defined in 
75-45-7.5 (3)). 
[^ J 10. The Defendant is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed 
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but is capable of working at a job which pay $ per hour based 
upon Defendant's work experience during the period of the parties' 
marriage and income should be attributed to the Defendant in the 
amount of % per month. 
[ ] 10. The Defendant is not employed and receives $ per 
mo nth unemployment, social security (or other countable public 
benefits as defined in 75-45-7.5 (1)) and receives $ per 
month AFDC (or other non-countable public benefits as defined in 
75-45-7.5 (3)). 
[ ] 10., The Defendant is employed at S(di-(3mJ^ed^ Attest~ 
earns $ per hour, works hours per week and therefore 
3 k/HJX grosses %/^WDJD£> per month. 
[ ] 10. The Defendant's workplace is unknown, but Plaintiff 
estimates Defendant earns $ per hour, works hours per 
week, and therefore grosses $ per month. 
11. Pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7 et seq. (1953 as amended) it is 
iccboiiable ana proper unat nhe [ jPlamtiff [ jDefendant be 
ordered to pay to the [ ]Plaintiff [ jDefendant as and for child 
support: 
a. A sum of not less than $ per month as base 
support for the minor children of the parties, pursuant to the 
Uniform Child Support Guidelines until said children become 18 years 
of age, or have graduated from high school during the children's 
normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later. 
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b. The base child support award should be reduced by 50% 
for each minor child for time periods during which such minor child 
is with the non-custodial parent by order for at least 25 of any 30 
consecutive days. If the dependent child is a recipient of Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children, any agreement by the parties for 
reduction of child support during extended visitation shall be 
approved by the Office of Recovery Services. However, normal 
visitation and holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be 
considered an interruption of the consecutive day requirement. 
c. The obligee (custodial parent) shall be entitled to 
mandatory income withholding relief pursuant to U.C.A. 62A-11 parts 
4 and 5 (1953 as amended), and any Federal and State tax refunds or 
rebates due the Defendant may be intercepted by the State of Utah 
and applied to existing child support arrearages. This income 
withholding procedure should apply to existing and future payors. 
All withheld income should be submitted to the Office of Recovery 
Services until such time as the Defendant no longer owes child 
support to tne Plaintiff. 
d. The issue of child support arrearages may be determined 
by further judicial or administrative process. 
e. r?r-u „c
 t j i e p(lr-_es sncula be unaer mutual obligation to 
notify the other within ten (10) days of any cnange in monthly 
Liiccn e. 
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£^5 Jufaffty 
12, Pursuant to U.C.A, 78-45-7.15 (1953) as amended, it is 
reasonable and proper that: 
a. Both parties should be required to maintain insurance 
for medical expenses for the benefit of the minor children where 
available at reasonable cost. 
b. Both parties shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs 
of the premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion 
of the insurance. 
^c. Both parties should share equally all reasonable and 
necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and 
co-payments, incurred for the minor children and actually paid by 
the parties. 
d. The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide 
written verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to 
the other parent within 30 days of payment. 
e. A parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the 
right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other 
parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with 
the Subparagraph "d" above. 
13. Pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7.16 (1953 as amended) both 
parties should share equally the reasonable work-related or career 
or occupational training for child care expenses of the custodial 
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parent. 
a. The non-custodial parent shall begin paying his or her 
share of child care expenses on a monthly basis immediately upon 
presentation of proof of the child care expense. 
b. The parent who incurs child care expenses shall provide 
written verification of the cost and identity of a child care 
provider to the other parent upon initial engagement of a provider 
and thereafter on the request of the other parent. The parent shall 
notify the other parent of any change of a child care provider or 
the monthly expense of child care within 30 calendar days of the 
date of the change. A parent incurring child care expenses may be 
denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover 
the other parent's share of the expenses if the parent incurring the 
expenses fails to comply with these provisions. 
[ ] 14. The parties have no outstanding debts or obligations. 
[ ] 14. During the course of the marriage, the parties have 
acquired certain debts and obligations. It is fair and reasonable 
"
u
~"
 u
 -. - ^ay the following: 
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a. The Plaintiff: 
II O b l i g a t i o n 
/fW^/S^Ti UuAiJtet-
/4rme ^xLge. 
I fWrvurn s {J-JMJIT-
1 (5^^M'S<rK LkileM 4tt>0, 
J 1 
*>• ^eek. 
Amount j 
* ^T*^o| 
$
 357-^1 
$
 <2Stf-£>d 
$
 7%5.oA 
* /£7. c£ 1 
$
 ^
f
- ^O 5
 1 
$ I 
b. The Defendant: 
O b l i g a t i o n 
ItMuA. OVL /titL^C V, Odd -<r0 
1 pyyj*X~ <m_ LOUL^L 
Amount 
$
 ISTO.60 
%L<W,&1) 
$ 
% 
$ $
 1 
$ 
$ || 
c. All remaining debts and obligations should be the 
responsibility of the party who incurred the particular debt. 
[ ] 15. During the course of the marriage relationship, the 
parties have acquired certain items of personal property. Said 
personal property cf the parties should be distributea as follows: 
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To t h e P l a i n t i f f ; Hri/Ui Lh3jf(Br-J 7'PUTTSt? S 
b . To t h e Defendant: jrff^^% heme +- p^rb^UA irhu-eA. 
c. All remaining personal property should be awarded to 
each of the parties as they have heretofore divided it. 
[ ] 16. The parties acquired no real property during the course of 
this marriage, nor QO \_hey presently own an interest in real 
property. 
[)/] 16. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired 
certain real property to wit: 
[ ] a. A home located at: 
• f 
more particularly described by the following legal 
description: 
QC Ver. 12-17-95 Page 14 of 20 FTwnTwrc ^ r.»/-
[ ] b. The Plaintiff alleges that such property should be sold 
as soon as reasonably practicable and the proceeds of the sale 
applied as follows: 
i. First, to pay expenses of sale; 
ii. Second, to retire any and all 
mortgages and liens; 
iii. Third, to pay all marital debts 
and obligations; 
iv. Last, the balance remaining 
thereafter to be divided equally 
between the parties. 
[ ] b. It is fair and reasonable that the [ JPlaintiff 
jV] Defendant be awarded the home and real property as 
[ JPlaintifffs [ jDefendanfs sole and exclusive property. 
[ ] b. The [ JPlaintiff [>"]Defendant should be awarded the 
exclusive use and possession of the parties' home until the 
occurrence of the first of the following conditions: 
i. The youngest child of the parties reaches 
eighteen (18) years of age, marries, or 
otherwise becomes emancipated; or/ 
ii. The party remarries; 
iii. The party ceases to use the home as the 
primary residence; 
iv. The party cohabits with a non-relative 
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adult of the opposite sex in the home. 
[ ] c. Upon the occurrence of the first of the conditions 
enumerated above, the Defendant should receive an appropriate share 
of the equity existing at the date of the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce in this matter in said home as determined by an appraisal 
conducted by a mutually agreed upon appraiser, and deducting from 
the appraised value the amount of all encumbrances. The Plaintiff 
should receive all equity in excess of the Defendant's 
aforementioned share of equity in said home existing at the time of 
the entry of the Decree in this matter. 
[ ] d. A home located at: 
more particularly described by the following legal 
description: 
Lfj. 7„„<Jr 47. <P/dJ-"A"i MMm dry ^dxjuer. S*y*fe; <**. 
] e. The Plaintiff alleges that such property should be sold 
as soon as reasonably practicable and the proceeds of the sale 
applied as follows: 
i. First, to pay expenses of sale; 
ii. Second, to retire any and all 
mortgages and liens; 
iii. Third, to pay all marital debts 
and obligations; 
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PC 
iv. Last, the balance remaining 
thereafter to be divided equally 
between the parties. 
[ ] e. It is fair and reasonable that the [ JPlaintiff 
[ ]Defendant be awarded the home and real property as 
[ ]Plaintiff's [ ]Defendant's sole and exclusive property. 
[ ] e. The [ ]Plaintiff [ ]Defendant should be awarded the 
exclusive use and possession of the parties' home until the 
occurrence of the first of the following conditions: 
i. The youngest child of the parties reaches 
eighteen (18) years of age, marries, or 
otherwise becomes emancipated; or/ 
ii. The party remarries; 
iii. The party ceases to use the home as the 
primary residence; 
iv. The party cohabits with a non-relative 
adult of the opposite sex in the home. 
[ ] f. Upon the occurrence of the first of the conditions 
enumerated above, the Defendant should receive an appropriate share 
of the equity existing at the date of the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce in this matter in said home as determined by an appraisal 
conducted by a mutually agreed upon appraiser, and deducting from 
the appraised value the amount of alJ encumbrances. The Pl?;.-^ -" 'r 
should receive all equity in excess of the Defendant's 
aforementioned share of equity in said home existing at the time of 
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the entry of the Decree in this matter. 
CSxl l"7- Neither party should be awarded alimony-
[ ] 17. It is reasonable that the Plaintiff be awarded a sum of 
not less than $__^__ per month as alimony from Defendant. 
[ ] 17. It is reasonable that the Defendant be awarded a sum of 
not less than %C£&*0T) per month as alimony from Plaintiff. 
[)A 18. The parties have acquired no interest in any pension or 
profit sharing plan during the course of the marriage. 
[ ] 18. The Defendant has pension and/or profit sharing plans or 
other retirement, benefits through Defendant's place of employment. 
It is reasonable and proper that the Plaintiff receive one-half (£) 
of all benefits accrued pursuant to such plans during the marriage. 
[ ] 19. The Plaintiff should be entitled to claim the parties' 
minor children as a tax deduction. 
[ ] 19. The Defendant should be entitled to claim the parties1 
minor child as a tax deduction. 
[ ] 20- The Defendant should be permanently restrained from 
bothering, harassing, annoying, threatening, or harming the 
Plaintiff at Plaintiff's place of residence, employment or any other 
place. 
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[ ] 21. Each party should be ordered to assume his/her own costs 
and attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this action. 
[ ] 21. It has been necessary for the Plaintiff to secure the 
services of an attorney to represent the Plaintiff in this action 
and it is reasonable that the Defendant be required to pay the 
Plaintiff's attorney's fees. 
[ ] 22. It is reasonable and proper that the [ ]Plaintiff 
[^Defendant be restored the use of her former name, 
H^(2^C -
[ ] 23. The Plaintiff has received public assistance from the 
State, and has assigned the right to collect child support accrued 
during the time public assistance was received to the State of Utah. 
Therefore, pursuant to the Utah Code Ann. 78-45-9, (1953), as 
amended, the State of Utah should be joined as a party in interest 
in the above-entitled action. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters 
its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court concludes that the parties are subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Court as set out above under the Court's 
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Findings of Fact, and that the Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of 
Divorce, the same to become final upon entry herein-
The Court concludes that all other issues of dispute have been 
resolved by the Court pursuant to the above Findings of Fact. 
DATED this , »3£:. 
On this 
copy of the foregoing Findi 
mailed, postage prepaid to 
e l&Mab l / /_M / s £-> < ^ X ^ ^ 
day a t r u e and c o r r e c t 
^and C o n c l u s i o n s o f Law was 
On t h i s day of 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
19 I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, postage prepaid, to 
and placed a true and correct copy of the same in the Attorney 
General's box in the Clerk's Office of the Juaicial 
District Court. 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT &AR - 6 2003 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAZIAH MAY HANCOCK, 
CINDY STEWART, 
and 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH 
OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-
DAY SAINTS OF THE LAST DAYS, 
JAMES D. HARMSTON, WILLIAM 
B. LITHGOW, KEITH LARSON, 
DANIEL (DAN) SIMMONS, KAY 
CRABTREE, KENT BRADDY, 
PHILLIP P. SAVAGE, IVAN 
DOUGLAS JORDAN, JOHN DOES 
1-5, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 980600126 
Judge David Mower 
Deposition of: 
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Reported by: 
JILL RINGEL * CSR, RPR 
ORIGINAL 
The Deposition of DOUG JORDAN was taken on behalf 
of the Defendants pursuant to Notice on 5/22/00 at the 
hour of 1:10 p.m. at the Utah County Courthouse, 125 
North 100 West, Provo, Utah. 
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Deposition of: DOUG JORDAN 
1 financial bind? 
2 A. Thatfs right. 
3 Q. And he is the head of the TLC church? 
4 A. That's true. 
5 Q. And he didn't go to Andy Ericson? 
6 A. That's true. 
7 Q. Why is that? 
8 A. Because it had to do as a person in 
9 need of money. 
10 Q. For his personal need? 
11 A. I don't know if it was for his personal 
12 need or what he as going to do with it. 
13 Q. He didn't tell you what he needed the 
14 money for? 
15 A. I didn't ask. 
16 Q. So when people came to you, you didn't 
17 ask what they needed it for? 
18 A. No, I had already known that they were 
19 going to ask. 
2 0 Q. But not what for? 
21 A. I never asked. They told me if they 
22 wanted to. If they didn't and it didn't line up with 
23 what was involved and what was given to me, I 
24 wouldn't participate. 
2 5 So if Jim came down and asked me for 
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1 money, I would have to think about it. I did pray 
2 about it. And I was told to give him double what he 
3 needed. And not to put a feather in my hat, but 
4 that's what I was told. 
5 Q. So if it's not a feather in your hat, 
6 it's doing your duty; isn't it? Wasn't it your duty 
7 to give that money to him? 
8 A. My duty to God. 
9 Q. Yeah. That's what a stewardship is; 
10 isn't it? 
11 A. Well, I had the money and I gave it. 
12 Q. You had a big chunk of money that Jim 
13 had handed you this check back that you consecrated 
14 and you were to use it for doing things as directed 
15 by the spirit? 
16 A. Yeah, because you got the direction. 
17 Q. And one of the things the spirit 
18 directed you to do was give a chunk of it back to Jim 
19 on this occasion when he asked for it? 
20 A. Yeah. 
21 Q. And a lot of people came to you and 
22 said, We understand you have got money. Can we have 
23 some? And sometimes you said yes and sometimes you 
24 said no? 
25 A. That's true. 
Ill 
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1 Q. That was your stewardship, to sort that 
2 out and decide? 
3 A. Well, if you want to classify that, the 
4 money was handed back to me and I could do with it 
5 what I wanted to do with it. 
6 Q. What you wanted to do? 
7 A. What I wanted to do was bring forth 
8 Zion. Now, if I did it gambling or if I did other 
9 things, then I would not be in good standing with 
10 God, I would assume. 
11 Whether or not you call it a 
12 stewardship or what you call it, you know, there's so 
13 many names that you could tag this to. It boggles 
14 the mind to get tied up in little words. 
15 What I did was I had money. I gave it. 
16 It was May's money. It was also my money. I gave it 
17 away no strings attached. Whether or not you 
18 classify it as consecration or not, I don't. 
19 I classify it as God said, Okay, you go 
20 ahead and do it. And whenever I have not done that, 
21 I have always got in trouble. I know people don't 
22 understand me. They think I'm cooky, I'm a 
23 right-brainer, I can't express myself, but what I'm 
24 saying here is the gospel truth. 
25 I don't want to be classified as a 
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1 person giving away other peoplefs money when other --
2 when the person that it's their money gave it to me 
3 to consecrate with. 
4 I want to make that pertinent, that 
5 people understand that I'm -- that I was doing it as 
6 a head of a household. I was doing it for a cause 
7 that I thought would take place. 
8 Q. And you were committed to use all your 
9 money of your family for that cause? 
10 A. Not all the money. You know, we had to 
11 eat and we had to pay bills and we had to do things. 
12 Q. All of the surplus money of your 
13 family? 
14 A. It was not squandered. 
15 Q. All the surplus money of your family 
16 for that cause? 
17 A. To bring forth Zion? Oh, absolutely. 
18 Q. All that money that was returned to you 
19 from the altar was for that purpose; wasn't it? 
20 A. To bring forth Zion. To help the cause 
21 of establishing a society that WELS -- that was far 
22 beyond the society of today. 
23 Q. Okay. Now, tell us with hindsight, 
24 were those good decisions? Did they build the cause? 
25 A. You know, that could be a trick 
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1 question. At the time it was helping the cause. And 
2 I still think it was to help the cause. 
3 Q. Okay. So with hindsight you still 
4 think it built the cause? 
5 A. Uh-huh. I think there's a cause beyond 
6 the cause that I don't want to get involved with 
7 because it will bother your mind of getting involved 
8 with scripture and that type of -- it would be better 
9 if we just put that to rest. 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 --0O0--
12 FURTHER EXAMINATION 
13 BY MR. HILTON: 
14 Q. Were you married to Kaziah May before 
15 the Indianola property was sold? 
16 A. Before, yes. 
17 Q. Did you have a prenuptial agreement? 
18 Prenuptial being an agreement before you got married 
19 on how you would hold different property or different 
2 0 assets in your marriage. 
21 A. No, we just played it by ear. 
22 Q. And was there any time where she 
23 requested to do a postnuptial agreement, some kind of 
24 agreement after you were married? 
25 A. That agreement on using the money? 
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1 Q. An agreement saying this was my 
2 property I brought into the marriage. I want to keep 
3 it separate. 
4 A. No, she gave it to me. I was on the 
5 account. 
6 Q. But you never had a written agreement 
7 where you sat down and spelled it out? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. That's all. 
10 (The Deposition concluded at 4:40 p.m.) 
11 I --0O0--
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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Bankruptcy Number 00-32966 JAB 
[Chapter 7] 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
ESTIMATING CLAIMS 4 AND 7 
Don S. Redd, Layton, Utah, appeared representing Kaziah May Hancock and Cindy Sue Stewart, 
Claimants. 
Budge W. Call and Kevin Bond, Salt Lake City. Utah, appeared representing Phillip P. Savage, 
Debtor. 
This seemingly innocuous estimation proceeding under 11 U.S.C. §502(c)(l) disguises 
not only the unusual basis for the claims asserted against this solvent chapter 7 estate, but also 
the heavy emotional toll exacted upon the parties by the underlying events. The claimants, 
Kaziah May Hancock (Hancock) and Cindy Sue Stewart (Stewart) (collectively the Claimants) 
filed unliquidated claims against the estate declaring kiLaw suit for fraud, breach of contract, etc." 
as the basis for each of their respective claims (Claims). Phillip P. Savage (Savage), the Chapter 
7 debtor, objects to the allowance of the Claims. 
Notwithstanding the unusual factual setting for these Claims and stripped of their unique 
origin, the resolution of the issues presented is quite straightforward. Based upon the evidence 
presented, having made an independent review of applicable law, and having set for the rationale 
of the decision below, the Court estimates both Claims at zero. 
FACTS 
Savage and the TLC 
At the times the events occurred that gave rise to the disputed Claims, Savage was a 
member of The True and Living Church of Jesus Christ of Saints of The Last Days (TLC), a 
fundamentalist religious organization located near Manti, Utah. James D. Harmston (Harmston) 
was the President and Prophet of the TLC. Savage believed in Harmston's teachings and that 
Harmston was God's spokesperson on earth. Savage originally occupied the governing position 
of an Apostle in the TLC's Quorum of the Twelve. Savage later occupied the position of 
Patriarch for the TLC as one charged with the responsibility for giving religious blessings to the 
members of the church. 
The TLC taught a religious doctrine entitled the Law of Consecration. This doctrine is 
evidenced by a Revelation on Consecration dated 19 March 1996, a document in which 
Harmston described a communication that he declares he had with the Lord. It states, in part, 
And it shall come to pass, that the Bishop of my Church, after that he has received 
the properties of My Church, that it cannot be taken from the Church, he shall 
appoint every man a steward over his own property, or that which he has received, 
inasmuch as is sufficient for himself and family.1 
The Revelation on Consecration was signed by Harmston, as President of the TLC, and affirmed 
by the members of the Quorum of the Twelve, including Savage. The document was not signed 
1
 Exhibit B. 
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by any other member of the TLC or by the Claimants. Hancock testified that she was aware of 
this teaching and that the Revelation itself was brought to church meetings, circulated among the 
members and accepted as a revelation from God to Harmston. 
The Law of Consecration was described differently by various witnesses. One witness 
described it as everything a member is and all of the member's possessions belonged to God and 
that TLC members were to covenant to make available all the member's time and talents to build 
up the kingdom of God. The Law of Consecration was also described as a symbolic proceeding. 
TLC members would draft a list of physical assets and personal talents that were being 
committed to the TLC and then submit the list to members of the TLC Bishopric. The Bishopric 
would, in turn, commit the assets back to the church member's possession as a steward for the 
TLC. Others, including the Claimants, took a more literal view of the Law of Consecration. 
They believed that their property would be physically, rather than symbolically, transferred to the 
TLC. Thereafter, they would physically receive back property as their stewardship. 
Hancock 
Hancock owned real property in the Indianola, Utah area (Indianola Property) that she 
acquired in the late 1980's and upon which she raised cattle and goats. She married Ivan Douglas 
Jordan (Jordan) in 1991 and he moved to her Indianola Property. Jordan was a member of the 
TLC. Hancock joined the TLC in 1993, adopted the TLC doctrine of plural marriage, and she 
and Jordan eventually decided to move to Manti, Utah. Hancock proceeded to sell her Indianola 
Property to effectuate the move, which sale was concluded in March of 1996. 
Harmston taught Hancock that the Law of Consecration required that she was to put all 
her belongings in the hands of the TLC through Jordan. It was Hancock's understanding that she 
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should deliver certain of the Indianola Property sale proceeds to Jordan to then be delivered to 
the TLC. Jordan, described by all as a very caring and generous man, distributed upwards of 
$250,000 of the Indianola Property sale proceeds to various entities and individuals, including 
Harmston and the TLC. He also gave approximately $2,500 to Savage as a gift to be used to 
remodel his home. 
On approximately September 6, 1996. Savage, in his capacity as Patriarch, gave Hancock 
a religious Patriarchal Blessing. This blessing led her to believe that she had a heightened 
obligation to participate in the Law of Consecration. Hancock testified that she believed that 
Savage, acting in his capacity as Patriarch and pronouncing a blessing upon her, was functioning 
as the mouthpiece for God. As such, it was God making promises to her, not Savage. Savage 
also testified that his statements to Hancock were statements of God, not his own statements. 
Hancock testified that as a result of the blessing, she felt obligated to surrender her property to 
Jordan for delivery to the TLC and that Savage "shamed" her in to doing so. The evidence 
establishes that the liquidation of the Indianola Property took place several months prior to the 
blessing. The evidence is unclear however, as to whether the transfers of the sale proceeds from 
Hancock to Jordan, and then from Jordan to others including the TLC, occurred before or after 
the blessing was given in September 1996. 
At a meeting on a date uncertain between members of the Bishopric, Jordan, Hancock 
and Jordan's other wives, Hancock believes she was promised a stewardship. She testified she 
believed she was to receive 20 acres of real property upon which she could raise livestock and 20 
shares of water as her stewardship in return for sun'endering the Indianola Property sale proceeds 
to Jordan and the TLC. Others present at the meeting dispute Hancock's allegation that she was 
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promised any real property. Savage was not present at the meeting. 
Hancock introduced selected pages of Jordan's May 22, 2000, deposition in an effort to 
establish that an agreement had been reached regarding Hancock's receipt of a stewardship. 
Taken as a whole, this testimony is vague and inconclusive in establishing any agreement. It 
does not establish specific terms or obligations, the parties to the conversations, the relative dates 
or the specific subject matter. The testimony references various conversations, but it does not 
establish any agreements. 
Hancock eventually located 15 acres of real property she wished to have as her 
stewardship upon which she and Jordan made a down payment in June of 1997. She believed 
that members of the hierarchy of the TLC, including Savage, approved of the purchase of the 15 
acres. No document between Hancock and the TLC or Savage exists that memorializes that 
understanding. Hancock also asserts that she was promised that the TLC would make the 
payments on the real property for her. It did not. 
Eventually, Jordan was excommunicated from the TLC, and on August 25, 1997, 
Hancock resigned her membership in the church. Jordan2 and Hancock were subsequently 
divorced by a Decree dated January 6, 1998. The Decree does not set forth any claims held by 
Hancock against Jordan or the TLC for the proceeds from the sale of the Indianola Property. 
Hancock claims that she is emotionally devastated as a result of the alleged "abusive 
conspiracy" to obtain her money and the TLC's refusal to provide her property for her 
stewardship. She is genuinely fearful that she will suffer bodily harm at the hands of TLC 
members for bringing this and other actions against the TLC to regain the Indianola Property 
2
 Jordan eventually died, although the date of that occurrence is not in the record. 
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sales proceeds. 
Stewart 
Stewart's introduction to the TLC is also premised upon a close family association. Her 
claim is all the more difficult for her emotionally because of her strained relationship with 
Savage. Stewart was adopted by Savage as a 12-year-old child who had already experienced a 
painful and difficult childhood. Over the years, the relationship between Stewart and Savage 
became uneasy. Savage testified that Stewart had "disowned him" as her father three times. 
As an adult, and following a troubling divorce. Stewart was convinced by Savage to join 
him in Manti, Utah so she could investigate Harmston, the TLC and its teachings. Yet, Stewart 
testified that at the time she joined Savage in Manti, it was her desire to do everything she could 
to please her father. 
Stewart eventually chose to join the TLC. Stewart was convinced by Harmston to give 
approximately $12,000 in proceeds from her 401 (k) retirement account to Harmston and the 
TLC. The 401(k) was essentially the only asset Stewart owned. Stewart testified that she 
believed the transfer of the $12,000 to the TLC was a loan, that the loan would eventually be 
repaid by the TLC, and that the TLC would pay any tax penalties that arose as a result of the 
early liquidation of her 401(k). 
Harmston testified that the transfer was not a loan, although Harmston's overall testimonv 
is not particularly credible. Stewart believes that Sa\ age "vouched" for Harmston, that 
Harmston. not Savage, promised she would be repaid money lent to the TLC, and that the TLC 
would take care of all her needs for the remainder of her life. Stewart admits that she save all her 
funds to Harmston, not Savage. Stewart testified that Savage did not receive any direct benefit 
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from the transaction, except to be proud of his daughter for having embraced the TLC and its 
teachings. Like Hancock. Stewart appears genuinely fearful that bodily harm will befall her for 
asserting her claims against Savage and the TLC. 
This Proceeding 
Savage filed this Chapter 7 case on November 8,2000. The trustee requested and the 
Court fixed August 22, 2001, as a bar date for filing claims. Hancock filed claim number 4 for 
$462,681.33 and Stewart filed claim number 7 for $32,839.84. Both claims were filed on April 
12, 2002. The Claimants both represented by the same attorney and the Claims were signed on 
the Claimants' behalf by their attorney. The description listed as the basis for each claim is the 
same: "Law suit for fraud, breach of contract, etc." No supporting documentation is attached to 
the Claims and there is no information presented on the face of either claim to identify the bona 
fides of the lawsuit. Hancock's claim indicates that the purported debt upon which the claim is 
based arose in "1993 through 1997." Stewart's claim fixes the dates that the purported debt 
arose as "1995 through 1997." The Court looks to these facts to make an initial determination as 
to the allowability of the Claims. 
DISCUSSION 
/. Procedural Posture of the Case 
Savage filed objections to claims number 4 and 7 asserting the Claims were not timely 
filed and that no liability existed. The Claimants responded, referencing certain related 
proceedings in state court as the underlying basis of their Claims. The Court determined that the 
most efficient manner for dealing with these unliquidated Claims and avoiding undo delay in 
Opm0300upd Page 7 of 19 revised4/4/03- 8 49 am 
administering the estate was through an estimation proceeding.3 The scope of the evidentiary 
hearing was further narrowed to make a preliminary determination of whether Savage was liable 
to the Claimants prior to any determination of the estimated amount of any allowed claims. 
Upon conclusion of the evidential hearing, the matter was taken under advisement. 
IL Jurisdiction and Burden of Proof 
The Court has jurisdiction over this contested matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 
157. Venue in this division is proper. This is a core proceeding as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(b)(2)(A), (B) and (0), except to the extent precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5). 
A properly filed proof of claim constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity and 
amount of the claim.4 Such a claim is deemed allowed unless a party in interest objects.5 The 
objecting party has the burden of going forward with evidence supporting the objection. Such 
evidence must be of a probative force equal to that of the allegations contained in the proof of 
claim. However, an objection raising only legal issues is sufficient. Once the objecting party has 
reached this threshold, the creditor has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to the validity and 
amount of the claim.-
HI. Timeliness 
Savage objects to the Claims stating that they are untimely and should therefore be 
disallowed. Fed. R .Bankr .P. 3002(cj(5) go\ems the filing of a Proof of Claim in these 
11 U.S.C. § 502(c). 
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f). 
§ 502(a). 
In re Gene\a Steel Co . 260 B R 51" < 10th Cir. B.A.P. 2001). 
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5 
6 
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circumstances. It states that if notice of insufficient assets to pay a dividend was given to 
creditors and thereafter the clerk of court gives notice that payment of a dividend appears 
possible, creditors may file proofs of claim within 90 days after the mailing of the notice. That 
date was fixed as August 22, 2001. 
The Claims were filed April 11, 2002, at, the Claimants assert, the invitation of the 
chapter 7 trustee who was having difficulty obtaining sufficient claims to deplete the liquidated 
assets on hand in the estate. Section 502(b)(9) of Title 11 provides that an untimely filed claim 
may be disallowed, except to the extent tardily filed as permitted under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) 
of § 726(a).7 Since no distribution has been made in this case, and the case appears to be able to 
satisfy all timely filed claims, there is no basis for disallowing the claims, only for subordinating 
payment as set forth in the Code.8 
Therefore, as properly filed Claims, they constitute prima facie evidence of the validity 
and amount of the Claims and are deemed allowed subject to the objection of a party in interest. 
In this case. Savage has objected and presented sufficient legal argument, in light of the 
unliquidated nature of the claims and the lack of any supporting documentation to state the basis 
of the claims, that the burden of going forward with evidence supporting the Claims has shifted 
to the Claimants. 
§ 502(b)(9). 
* Drew v. Royal (In re Drew). 256 B.R. 799, 804 (10th Cir. B.A.P. 2001) (§ 502(b)(9) indicates that 
tardily-filed claims are to be allowed if they are covered by § 726(a)(3). In a chapter 7 case, claims tardily filed by 
creditors who had notice of the bankruptcy case are covered by § 726(a)(3), which indicates that such claims are 
penalized b> being subordinated to timely-filed ones, but are still to be paid before any surplus is distributed to the 
debtor). 
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IV The Parties' Positions 
In their response to Savage's claim objection, the Claimants eventually submitted a copy 
of the amended state court complaint filed in the 6lh Judicial Court in and for Sanpete County, 
State of Utah, case no. 980600126. This appears to be the missing complaint which names 
Savage as a party but against whom no judgment was ever entered because of Savage's 
bankruptcy filing, and the Claimants' joint pleadings admit that there is no judgment against 
Savage from the state court action. 
The Claimant's response incorporates the state court complaint which sets forth five basis 
for the Claims: (1) breach of a parole contract between the claimants, Savage and the TLC; (2) 
fraud by Savage founded upon promises of Savage and his religious colleagues which wrongfully 
induced the claimants to give them money: (3) that Savage was unjustly enriched via his 
religious organization and the funds TLC received from the Claimants; (4) the activities engaged 
in by Savage and his TLC colleagues constitute a racketeering enterprise under Utah Code 
Annotated §76-10-1601 et seq.; and (5) Savage intentionally inflicted emotional harm on each of 
the Claimants.9 
Having now conducted the evidentiary hearing, it appears that the specific facts related to 
9
 Claimants also seek a ruling of non-dischargeability in the final sentences of their trial brief and in oral 
argument. Such a request must be brought as an adversary proceeding within time limits set by the Bankruptcy Code. 
The applicable time limits have long since expired. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4007(c) requires that a complaint under § 523(c) be 
filed no later than 60 days after the first meeting of creditors. The my v. Yu (In re Themy), 6 F.3d 688.689 (10th Cir. 
1993) (adopting strict interpretation of rule 4007 (o sixty day time limit and binding creditor with actual notice of 
bankruptcy time limit); Walker v. Wilde (In re Walker) 927 F.2d 1138. 1144-45 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that § 523 (c) 
claims can not find refuge under § 523(a)(3j if creditors had actual knowledge of bankruptcy case in time to timely file 
proof of claim and request determination of discharge). Although the trustee sought various extensions of time to file 
a proceeding under § 727. the subsequent proceeding v. as dismissed with prejudice and Savage's discharge was issued 
on May 16. 2001. Therefore, a ruling of non-dischargeability is procedurally improper and time barred. The Court 
declines to rule on whether the Claims asserted b\ the Claimants are dischargeable and makes no finding as to whether 
the Claimants received timely notice of this case. ;n the context of this claims estimation proceeding. 
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Hancock which give rise to her claim are premised upon her failure to receive a stewardship of 
land that she believes she was promised. As to Stewart, her claim is that the 401(k) funds given 
to Harmsron were a loan that has not been repaid. 
Savage responds that the state court law suit provides no basis for the Claims because (1) 
he was not subject to the state court judgment, (2) the actual state court judgement was not 
attached to the Claims as filed and that such a failure is fatal to the validity of the Claims, (3) the 
referenced law suit and accompanying judgment does not include Savage, and (4) the Claimants 
have no legal basis upon which to file a claim. More to the substance of the matter, Savage 
argues that he did not commit any fraud or breach any contract with the Claimants. Savage 
asserts he could not have breached any contract or committed any fraud relative to the Claimants 
because he did not receive any money from the Claimants, did not enter into any contracts with 
them and did not make any representations to them. Savage also argues that any assertion by 
Hancock that she was entitled to a stewardship of land is void under the statute of frauds. 
Further, Savage asserts that this Court may not meddle in matters based on the parties' religious 
beliefs because any such ruling would necessarily implicate an excessive governmental 
entanglement with religion thus implicating the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Finally, Savage argues that if a claim existed in Hancock's favor, it was against 
Jordan, not Savage, and any such claims against Jordan were resolved in the subsequent divorce 
proceeding. 
V. Core Matters and the First Amendment 
The Court has previously ruled that this is a core proceeding as contemplated by 28 
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A). (B) and (0), except to the extent precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5). 
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Section 157(b)(5) prevents this Court from trying personal injury tort claims. Therefore, to the 
extent that the Claims assert a debt owed by Savage as a result of the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress while acting in his ecclesiastical role with the TLC, those tort claims cannot be 
adjudicated in this forum. Indeed, it appears that they cannot be adjudicated elsewhere if 
premised upon a state law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, for "it is well settled 
that civil tort claims against clerics that require the courts to review and interpret church law, 
policies, or practices in the determination of the claims are barred by the First Amendment under 
the entanglement doctrine."10 
VI. Breach of Contract 
The Claimants assert that they were promised a stewardship under the TLC Law of 
Consecration and that this promise constitutes a binding contract between them and Savage. 
This assertion is unavailing. "It is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral 
features of an agreement is essential to the formation of a contract."11 The evidence indicates 
that there was no meeting of the minds between Savage and either Claimant. 
As to Hancock, if the meeting between members of the Bishopric, Jordan, Hancock and 
Jordan's other wives, forms the basis of Hancock's contract claim, others present at the meeting, 
including members of the TLC, dispute that an agreement was reached that she would be 
supplied land. Even if such an agreement was reached, it would have been between the TLC and 
Hancock, and not Savage and Hancock. Indeed, as to Hancock's claim, there was no evidence 
10
 Franco v. The Church of Jesus Chris: ofLancr-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 203 (Utah 2001) and cases 
cited therein. 
11
 Richard Barron Ent. Inc.. v. Tsem. 92S P.2d 36S. 373 (Utah 1996) (citing Pingree v. Cont'l Group 
of Utah, Inc.. 558 P.2d 1317. 1321 (Utah 1976)) 
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admitted at the hearing which established that Hancock and Savage had a meeting of the minds 
relative to any obligations which Savage individually owed to Hancock. The only direct payment 
received by Savage came from Jordan, Hancock's husband, in the form of the $2,500 gift. There 
is no evidence that there was any agreement between Hancock, Jordan and Savage that those 
funds should be repaid to Hancock. To the contrary, from the uncontroverted testimony, Jordan 
was a generous man who regularly shared his wealth with others. 
Similarly as to Hancock, and even though there is conflicting evidence as to whether her 
401(k) transfer was a consecration or a loan, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that 
Stewart and Savage had a meeting of the minds relative to any obligation Savage had to repay 
Stewart the 401(k) funds. Assuming that indeed Savage "vouched" for Harmston, such an 
endorsement from a believing father to his obedient adult child is insufficient at law to make 
Savage a party to any contract which may have existed between Stewart and Harmston, or 
Stewart and the TLC. There is no evidence establishing that Savage was present at the time 
Stewart and Harmston agreed that Stewart would make the transfer of her 401(k) assets. Nor is 
there any documentation establishing any rights or obligations between the parties. While 
Stewart may have been trying to please her father when she delivered the funds to Harmston, 
such action does not make Savage liable for repayment of the funds to Stewart. 
Further, "[w]hen there exists only the facade of a promise, i.e., a statement made in such 
vague or conditional terms that the person making it commits himself to nothing, the alleged 
promise is said to be Illusory"".12 Assume for the moment that Savage, because he was once a 
member of the Quorum of the Twelve, was somehow authorized to enter into a contract with the 
!2
 Resource Mgmi. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028. 1036 (Utah 1985). 
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Claimants on behalf of the TLC. Also assume that the basis of the promise to the Claimants 
regarding their stewardship was the Revelation on Consecration. Even with these assumptions, 
the contract argument nevertheless fails because the Revelation on Consecration is vague and 
conditional. It does not specifically refer to either Hancock or Stewart. Nor does it set forth 
what property may be the subject of the stewardship. It "neither binds the person making it, nor 
functions as consideration for a return promise/'13 It is simply a statement of religious doctrine 
and cannot be found to be an offer that would be contractually binding. 
Finally, if the crux of Hancock's contract claim is that the TLC failed in its promise to 
make payments on Hancock's 15 acres, the claim also fails as a matter of law because it violates 
several aspects of the statute of fraud. If the TLC was to be the purchaser of the 15 acres, no 
document exists to support that critical fact, and without documentation, any such contract must 
fail.14 If Hancock asserts that the agreement was that the TLC would answer for the debt 
incurred by Hancock and Jordan, it would likewise be unenforceable.15 Had there been such an 
agreement, it likely would have taken longer than a year to perform, and without a writing to 
support the promise, would be unenforceable.16 
14
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-1(2002) (No interest in real property, other than a lease for less than a year, 
may be created unless conveyed in writing subscribed b> the party creating the same); Smngle v. Ernst Home Or., Inc., 
948 P.2d 356 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (accord). 
15
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4 (2) (an agreement is void unless in writing if it promises to answer for the 
debt of another). 
16
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4 (1) iE\ery agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one 
year from the making of the agreement must be in writing). 
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VII. Fraud 
The more interesting argument made by the Claimants is that they were defrauded out of 
their funds. To establish fraud, the Claimants must prove the following by clear and convincing 
evidence: 
(1) That a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing material 
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to 
base such representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act 
upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; 
(7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and 
damage.17 
These Claims, to the extent they assert fraud as a basis, are not impacted by the First 
Amendment.18 While a compelling case might be made in a different forum to establish that the 
Claimants may have been deceived by someone affiliated with the TLC, or may have been 
intimidated with threats of serious bodily harm and as a result parted with their funds, such a 
compelling case has not been made here.against Savage. 
Hancock asserts that Savage gave her a Patriarchal Blessing, the contents of which 
compelled her to deliver the Indianola Property sale proceeds to Jordan, with Jordan having the 
responsibility under TLC doctrine to then deliver the same to the TLC. However, the Patriarchal 
Blessing did not cause Hancock to liquidate the Indianola Property in the first place. The 
liquidation predated the Patriarchal Blessing given to Hancock. Therefore, in order to make a 
case for fraud. Hancock would have to prove that the representations made to her by Savage in 
1
' Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty. 641 P.2d 124.126 (Utah 1982) (quoting Pace v. Parish, 247 P.2d 
273. 274-75 (Utah 1952)). 
18
 Franco. 2\ P.3d at 207. 
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the Patriarchal Blessing concerned a presently existing material fact that was false, that Savage 
knew of the falsity or made the statements recklessly in order to induce Hancock to part with her 
money, and that she acted reasonably and in reliance upon those statements to her injury. In 
addition, she must prove this by clear and convincing evidence. 
This Court cannot find that Savage knew the statements he made in the Patriarchal 
Blessing were false at the time made. And, it is impossible to prove that they are, in fact, false. 
More to the point, it is difficult to conclude that it was those statements that induced Hancock to 
surrender her assets to Jordan. At the time she liquidated the Indianola Property and at the time 
she consecrated her funds to Jordan and then to others including the TLC, Hancock apparently 
truly believed in the teachings of Harmston and the TLC. Although she may have felt an added 
responsibility or urgency to surrender her funds as a result of the Patriarchal Blessing, it is 
impossible to separate her actions that were motivated by her religious convictions from her 
reliance upon the statements in the Patriarchal Blessing. 
Stewart has not presented any clear and convincing evidence that Savage defrauded her of 
the funds in her 401(k). Since "vouching" for Harmston is the evidentiary link between Savage 
and Harmston's or the TLC's acquisition of Stewart's funds, Stewart must prove that Savage 
knew at the time he urged Stewart to transfer the funds that Harmston was not trustworthy or 
reliable, or further, that he was not worthy of the religious devotion that Savage placed in him. 
Although Stewart may now disbelieve Harmston's credentials, and indeed may have good reason 
to, there is no evidence that Savase held such disbelief relative to Harmston at the time Stewart 
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parted with her funds. Further, it appears that much, if not all, of Stewart's motivation was to 
prove herself to be "the golden child," a devoted daughter to Stewart, rather than by placing an 
objective reliance upon Savage's opinion of Harmston. Therefore, Stewart has failed to carry her 
burden to prove fraud. 
Both Claimants assert that they have received threats of physical harm by persons 
associated with the TLC; presumably resulting from Claimants' attempts to retrieve their funds. 
The Court has no doubt that the Claimants fears are real and substantial, and may, in fact, be 
based upon threats received from individuals that may be connected with the TLC. However, 
those threats would only be relevant to this proceeding in two ways: (1) if the threats of physical 
harm induced the Claimants to surrender their funds, and (2) if Savage made the threats or caused 
them to be made. Neither scenario has been alleged or proved.19 
CONCLUSION 
This ruling will seem harsh to the Claimants for they have lost both their money and their 
once devoutly held religious convictions. Sometimes the law can remedy the first - it can seldom 
remedy the second. The Claimants have simply failed to muster sufficient evidence to prove 
their claims against Savage. Whether the Claimants have a cause of action against Harmston, the 
TLC or others is not within the province of this Court. Therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that claim number 4 is estimated at zero, and it is further 
The Claimants assert that their Claims also arise under the civil penalty provisions of the Utah Pattern 
of Unlawful Activity Act. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1605 (2002) apparently as itemized in the State Court Complaint. 
The Complaint recites that Harmston is the person who has allegedly committed theft by deception, theft of services, 
unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary, and communications fraud. The Court expresses no opinion regarding 
these allegations against Harmston. the TLC or others associated therewith besides Savage. Section 76-10-1605(1) 
requires that the plaintiff be injured by the person who is engaged in conduct forbidden by the statute. The Claimants 
have failed, as set forth above, to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Savage engaged in such conduct. 
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ORDERED, that claim number 7 is estimated at zero. 
DATED this *L day of April, 2003. 
JUDITH A. BOUEDEN 
United States Bankruptcy Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
ESTIMATING CLAIMS 4 AND 7 upon the following at the address set forth below, postage 
prepaid, by depositing the same in the United States Mail on the y th day of April, 2003. 
Don S. Redd 
44 North Main 
Layton, UT 84041 
Attorney for Kazaih May Hancock and Cindy Stewart, Claimants 
Budge W. Call 
311 South State , Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Phillip P. Savage, Debtor 
Stephen W. Rupp 
McKay, Burton & Thurman 
10 E. South Temple, # 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Law Clerk 
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DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUNTY, UTAH 
160 North Main 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Telephone: 435-835-2131 Fax: 435-835-2135 
KAZIAH MAY HANCOCK, and CINDY 
STEWART, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST OF SAINTS OF THE LAST 
DAYS, JAMES D. HARMSTON, WILLIAM 
B. LITHGOW, KEITH LARSON, DANIEL 
(DAN) SIMMONS, KAY CRABTREE, 
KENT BRADDY, JEFF HANKS, BART 
MUSTROM, JOHN HARPER and JOHN 
DOES NOS. 1-5,
 j 
Defendants. , 
DECISION IN REGARDS TO 
1 MOTION TO DISMISS 
1 Case No. 980600126 
1
 Assigned Judge: DAVID L. MOWER 
A portion of this case is presently at issue and ready for a decision. The issue is raised by 
the combination of the Amended Complaint and a Motion to Dismiss. 
The Amended Complaint was filed on March 10, 1999. The Motion to Dismiss was filed 
on March 14, 2003 by Attorney Kevin Bond on behalf of the defendants represented by him. 
INTRODUCTION 
The analytical method to be used is this: Assume that the complaint is true and then 
analyze its claims to see if any are deficient. 
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ANALYSIS 
The Amended Complaint contains five separate claims or causes of action. I intend to 
analyze each one separately. 
Part One - First Cause of Action 
"BREACH OF CONTRACT-ALL DEFENDANTS." The analytical method I prefer to 
use is to search for the verbs in the language of the document. This helps me focus in on the 
most relevant language of the claim. This method has led me to the following language which is 
quoted directly from paragraphs 9, 11, and 12 of the Amended Complaint. I believe that this 
language is the essence of the claim in the first cause of action. 
Plaintiffs were ... promised by the [defendants] that they would 
receive ... a "stewardship" of property or support... . 
Plaintiffs did deliver money, goods, and services ... . 
Plaintiffs never received a "stewardship ...." 
There are two types of defendants in this case, individuals and organizations. Two 
organizations are referred to by name in the Amended Complaint. One of those is "The True and 
Living Church of Jesus Christ of The Saints of the Last Days." The other is "The Church of the 
Firstborn." 
The Amended Complaint contains several instances of words in quotation marks. I will 
list them here. 
"the TLC" 
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"Bishopric" 
"stewardship" 
"consecrate" 
"consecrated" 
Sometimes an author uses quotation marks to signify words with special or unique 
meaning based on circumstances or relationships. That could certainly be true in this case. 
However, the drafter of the Amended Complaint has not explained the reason for placing certam 
words in quotation marks. I will use the common dictionary definitions for these words. 
Here are two of those definitions: 
Stewardship 
Pronunciation: 'stuu-&rd-l!ship, 'styiiu-; 'st(y)u(-&)rd-
Function: noun 
Date: 15th century 
1 : the office, duties, and obligations of a steward 
2 : the conducting, supervising, or managing of something; 
especially : the careful and responsible management of something 
entrusted to one's care stewardship of our natural resources> 
Steward 
Pronunciation: 'stiiu-&rd, 'styiiti-; !st(y)u(-&)rd 
Function: noun 
Etymology: Middle English, from Old English stlweard, from stl, 
stig hall, sty + weard ward — more at STY, WARD 
Date: before 12th century 
1 : one employed in a large household or estate to manage 
domestic concerns (as the supervision of servants, collection of 
rents, and keeping of accounts) 
2 : SHOP STEWARD 
3 : a fiscal agent 
4 a : an employee on a ship, airplane, bus, or train who manages 
the provisioning of food and attends passengers b : one appointed 
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to supervise the provision and distribution of food and drink in an 
institution 
5 : one who actively directs affairs : MANAGER 
Merriam-Webster On-Line Dictionary (www.m-w.com) 
Since a stewardship is a noun then it is a thing. One may wonder if the right to manage 
someone else's property is a thing of value. However, the analysis here is not concerned with 
value, only with whether or not a claim is stated. Here we have this claim: I was promised one 
thing in exchange for another. I gave but didn't receive. I am entitled. 
My conclusion is that a claim is stated. 
Part Two - Second Cause of Action 
"FRAUD/CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD/NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION - all 
defendants." 
Part 2,a, - Second Cause of Action - Fraud 
The words "fraud" and "particularity" have become linked by the jurisprudence of our 
state. For example, see P36 oi Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and 
Others, 21 P.3d 200, Utah Supreme Court, 2001. I refer specifically to this sentence: "We have 
stressed, and continue to hold, that mere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a 
recitation of relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude ... summary judgment." 
As I read the text of this cause of action I looked for information about particular dates, 
times, places, names of people, words that were spoken. I found none. Hence the cause of action 
is deficient and should be dismissed. 
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Part 2.b. Second Cause of Action - Constructive Fraud 
Constructive Fraud must also be plead with particularity. The complaint is lacking in 
particulars about times, places, names of people, words that were spoken. This cause of action is 
deficient and should be dismissed. 
Part 2.c. - Second Cause of Action - Neeligent Misrepresentation 
This cause of action is plead as an alternative to Constructive Fraud. It should contain the 
same specific information as the fraud claims. Since it does not it is deficient and should be 
dismissed. 
Part Three - Third Cause of Action 
"FRAUDULENT CONVERSION or in the alternative UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT/IMPLIED CONTRACT-all Defendants." 
The special words from this cause or action are: 
Defendants have acquired ... money ... by fraudulent conversion 
and/or [sic] unjust enrichment. 
Defendants have breached an implied contract... by refusing to 
provide ... valuable consideration, as promised in the full 
amount.... 
... Defendants have been unjustly enriched. 
This cause of action is essentially the same as the first cause since its resolution depends 
on the value of a stewardship. The Third Cause of Action does state a claim and will not be 
dismissed. 
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Part Four - Fourth Cause of Action 
"RACKETEERING - all Defendants." 
Private, civil lawsuits are authorized for violation of Utah's Racketeering Enterprises Act. 
The authorization is found in Section 76-10-1605(1), Utah Code. 
The same statute requires that the elements of each claim be stated with particularity. See 
Section 76-10-1605(7). 
There is nothing in the fourth cause of action that refers to particular dates, times, places, 
people, words or actions. Hence, this cause of action is deficient and should be dismissed. 
Part Five - Fifth Cause of Action 
"INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL HARM - All Defendants." 
A required element of this tort relates to intent. More specifically, the element relates to 
the defendants' intent. The element is that the defendant"... intended to cause, or acted in 
reckless disregard of the likelihood of causing, emotional distress . . . ." Retherfordv. AT&T 
Communications of the Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 970-971 (Utah Supreme Court 
1992). 
The Complaint is silent as to this element. Hence it is deficient, and the cause of action 
should be dismissed. 
Mr. Bond is appointed to draft an appropriate order and to submit it for execution by 
following the procedure set forth in Rule 4-504. 
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Distnct Court Judge 
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IN THE SKTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SANPETE COUNTY, STA-TE OF UTAH 
KAZIAH MAY HANCOCK, and ) 
CINDY STEWART, 
Plaintiffs, 
THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH 
OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER- ) 
DAY SAfNTS OF THE LAST DAYS, 
JAMES D. HARMSTON, WILLIAM ) 
B. LITHGOW, KEITH LARSON, 
DANIEL (DAN) SIMMONS, KAY ) 
CRABTREE. KENT BRADDY, 
PHILLIP P. SAVAGE, JEFF HANKS and 
JOHN DOES NOS. 1-5, 
Defendants. 
ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 980600126 
Judge David L. Mower 
The above entitled matter having been submitted for decision, the Court having 
reviewed the Plaintiffs' memorandums and the Defendants' memorandums, and otherwise being 
fully advised in the premises, hereby Orders, Adjudges, and Decrees as follows: 
1. The Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action, Fraud/Constructive Fraud/Negligent 
Misrepresentation is dismissed. 
2. The Plaintiffs* Fourth Cause of Action under the Utah's Racketeering 
Enterprises Act is dismissed. 
3. The Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action for intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Harm is dismissed. 
4. The only actions remaining in the case are Plaintiffs" Breach of Contracc Claim 
and Plaintiffs' Claim for Unjust Enrichment which are not dismissed. 
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DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUNTY, UTAH 
160 North Main 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Telephone: 435-835-2131 Fax: 435-835-2135 
KAZIAH MAY HANCOCK, and CINDY 
STEWART, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST OF SAINTS OF THE LAST 
DAYS, et al., 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTION TO FILE 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Case No. 980600126 
Assigned Judge: DAVID L. MOWER 
The Plaintiffs have made a motion to file an amended complaint. It was accompanied by 
a proposed pleading entitled Third Amended Complaint. There have been memoranda filed in 
opposition to the motion, and it is now ripe and ready for decision. 
DECISION 
The motion should be denied. 
ANALYSIS 
The motion is not timely. Were it to be granted, it would require the fact finder to judge 
church doctrine which is not allowed. Were it to be allowed, it alleges actions by Ivan Douglas 
Jordan, who is not a party to this action, and complete relief could not be afforded. Mr. Call is 
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appointed to draft an appropriate order and submit it for execution by following the procedures 
set forth in Rule 4-504 CJA. 
Date /'* QaT _, 2003 
David L. Mower 
District Court Judge 
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John H. Jacobs 
Attorney for Crabtree 
F. Kevin Bond 
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Clark R. Nielsen 
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Keith Larson 
Address 
44 N. Main 
Layton, Utah 84041 
75 N. Center St. 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
311 S. State, Suite 410 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
68 S. Main St., Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
37550 Pine Knoll Ave. 
Palm Desert, CA 92211 
524 W. Juniper 
Snowflake, AZ 85937 | 
X 
F. Kevin Bond (5039) 
Budge W. Call (5047) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
311 South State, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-8900 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAI'JAH MAY HANCOCK, and 
CINDY STEWART, 
Plaintiffs, 
THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH 
OF JESUS CHRIST OF SAINTS 
OF THE LAST DAYS, JAMES D. 
HARMSTON, WILLIAM B. 
LITHGOW, KEITH LARSON, 
DANIEL (DAN) SIMMONS, KAY 
CRABTREE, JEFF HANKS, 
BART MUSTROM, JOHN HARPER 
and JOHN DOES NOS. 1-5, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON MOTION TO FILE 
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 980600126 
Judge David L. Mower 
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend, accompanied by a proposed Third 
Amended Complaint, and with memoranda filed in opposition to the Motion, the Motion now being 
ripe for decision; the Court having reviewed the memoranda and record on file, hereby rules as 
follows: 
1. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' Motion is denied. 
2. The Motion was not timely filed. 
3. For the Motion to be granted, it would require the fact finder to judge church 
doctrine, which is not allowed. 
4. It alleges actions by Ivan Douglas Jordan, who is not a party to this action, 
and complete relief could not be afforded. 
DATED this ^ day of October, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
iU 
David L. Mower [ 
District Court Judge \ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
l<^z*f 
Don S. Redd 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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